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A BALANCED CONSIDERATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S  
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE 
 
Jennifer E. Sturiale* 
 
Abstract 
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is unique. Unlike the jurisdiction 
of all other U.S. courts of appeals, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is 
defined not by its geographical boundaries, but rather by the subject 
matter of the original claims and compulsory counterclaims. The court has 
appellate jurisdiction over final decisions from all U.S. district courts if a 
plaintiff’s claim or a party’s counterclaim arises under the patent laws. 
From this unusual jurisdictional grant, the Federal Circuit has concluded 
that, as a policy matter, it should apply and develop its own law only if the 
legal issue pertains to patent law. For all other legal issues, the Federal 
Circuit defers to the law of the court of appeals in which the case 
originated—i.e., it applies the procedural law and the non-patent 
substantive law of the regional circuits. 
This Article undertakes a thorough evaluation of the Federal 
Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. It examines how the rule compares against 
the congressional objectives reflected in the court’s enabling statute as 
well as against possible alternative rules. In addition, it considers how the 
court’s rule causes the court to depart from the trans-substantivity 
principle of procedural law and a related principle of equity in a non-
transparent manner, and, in doing so, engage in substantive lawmaking 
that may be beyond the court’s authority. Finally, this Article 
contemplates solutions beyond a mere change in the court’s choice-of-law 
rule. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In a 2014 decision, In re Barnes & Noble, Inc.,1 the Federal Circuit reviewed a 
district court’s decision denying the defendant’s motion to transfer.2 The defendant 
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus, ordering the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Tennessee to vacate its order denying the 
defendant’s motion to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California, and ordering the court to transfer the case.3 Ultimately, the 
Federal Circuit denied the defendant’s writ, causing the case to remain in the 
Western District of Tennessee.4 
The Federal Circuit’s decision is short. But it yielded a dissent.5 At first blush, 
the disagreement between the majority and the dissent appears to be about what law 
should apply: the law of the Fifth Circuit or the law of the Sixth Circuit.6 This 
disagreement, alone, is a bit peculiar. After all, federal appellate courts typically 
apply their own law or the law of the court that directly reviews their decisions—
that is, the law of the Supreme Court. 
The Federal Circuit, however, applies an unusual choice-of-law rule. Pursuant 
to the rule, the court considers not which of two or more states’ or nations’ laws it 
should apply by doing a comparative analysis of the sovereigns’ laws and interests.7 
Rather, the court considers which court of appeals’ law to apply—its own law or the 
law of the regional circuit court in which the case originated. Pursuant to this rule, 
the Federal Circuit applies and develops its own law only if the legal issue pertains 
to patent law.8 For all other legal issues, the Federal Circuit defers to the law of the 
court of appeals that embraces the district court in which the case first arose. Thus, 
the Federal Circuit “review[s] procedural matters, that are not unique to patent 
issues, under the law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the 
district court would normally lie.”9 And it reviews non-patent, substantive law issues 
under the law of the regional circuit court in which the case originated.10 For 
                                                   
1 743 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
2 Id. at 1382. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 1384.  
5 Id. at 1384–85. 
6 Id. at 1384–85. 
7 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 2 (AM. LAW. INST. 1971); id. 
§ 6 (discussing choice-of-law analysis). 
8 See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam) (“The requirement to obey the law of its circuit causes practitioners and district 
judges, in general, to follow the substantive patent law as set forth by this court in ‘patent’ 
cases and to follow the ‘general’ laws as set forth by their regional circuit court in non-patent 
cases.”). 
9 Id. at 1574–75. 
10 See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The 
freedom of the district courts to follow the guidance of their particular circuits in all but the 
substantive law fields assigned exclusively to this court is recognized in the foregoing 
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example, when the Federal Circuit reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny 
a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), it will apply the precedent of 
the regional court of appeals in which the case originated.11 Thus, if a case originated 
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, but was transferred to the 
Northern District of California, a plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandamus to the 
Federal Circuit challenging the transfer would be reviewed under the law of the Fifth 
Circuit, where the Eastern District of Texas is located. 
The court’s rule derives from the court’s unique jurisdictional grant. Unlike the 
jurisdiction of all other U.S. courts of appeals, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is 
defined not by its geographical boundaries, but rather by the subject matter of the 
original claims and compulsory counterclaims. The Federal Circuit has appellate 
jurisdiction over final decisions from all U.S. district courts if at least one of the 
plaintiff’s claims or a party’s compulsory counterclaim “aris[es] under” the patent 
laws.12 As a result of this jurisdictional grant, the Federal Circuit can review 
decisions from all ninety-four federal district courts, situated within all twelve of the 
regional circuits. Appeals from cases that do not—and never did13—contain issues 
of patent law, however, are appealed to the regional circuit court embracing the 
district court.14 Thus, following the Federal Circuit’s creation, some of the cases 
decided by district courts are appealable to the regional circuit courts, while others 
are appealable to the Federal Circuit. Mindful of the challenge these dual appellate 
paths present to the district courts, especially when deciding procedural issues, the 
Federal Circuit adopted its choice-of-law rule “as a matter of policy.”15  
The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule has prompted criticism from scholars 
and commentators, particularly as the rule relates to procedural law. Most have noted 
the incoherence, inconsistent application, and unworkability of the rule.16 The 
                                                   
opinions and in this case.”). 
11 See Barnes & Noble, 743 F.3d at 1383.  
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018). 
13 See infra note 264. 
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1294(1) (2018).  
15 Panduit Corp v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam). 
16 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 40 (1989) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, A Case Study] 
(“The indeterminacy of the [Federal Circuit’s] line drawing has led different panels to reach 
inconsistent conclusions on whether regional law or Federal Circuit law applies to given 
procedural issues.”); id. at 59 (“The rule requiring the [Federal Circuit] to defer to regional 
law in nonpatent substantive areas does not work well . . . .”); see also Kimberly A. Moore, 
Juries, Patent Cases, & a Lack of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 800 (2002) (“While 
seemingly straight-forward, the current choice of law rule, requiring the court to apply 
regional circuit law on a procedural issue unless it is ‘unique to’ patent law, has proven 
elusive in practice.”); see generally Peter J. Karol, Who’s at the Helm? The Federal Circuit’s 
Rule of Deference and the Systematic Absence of Controlling Precedent in Matters of Patent 
Litigation Procedure, 37 AIPLA Q. J. 1 (2009) (noting the rule’s “mutability and uncertain 
usage”); Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Choice of Law for Procedural 
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disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Barnes & Noble over the 
appropriate precedent suggests there is something to these critiques. Most 
commentators have accordingly proposed that the Federal Circuit discard its choice-
of-law rule and, instead, develop and apply its own procedural law.17 Some have 
proposed a systematic approach for determining whether a case raises a procedural 
issue pertinent to patent law.18 Yet others have simply implored the Federal Circuit 
for more guidance.19 
This Article takes a more cautious approach. First, it undertakes a more 
thorough evaluation of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule, including how the 
rule fits the congressional objectives reflected in the court’s enabling statute and 
how it compares to alternative rules. One of those objectives was to develop patent 
law in a more uniform manner; an insight of this Article’s evaluation is that the 
court’s rule undermines its efforts to unify patent law. Second, this Article considers 
how the rule causes the court to depart from the trans-substantivity principle of 
procedural law and a related principle of equity. One understanding of that principle 
of equity requires judges to treat substantively similar cases in a procedurally similar 
                                                   
Matters in Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 664–65 (2009) (noting the Federal 
Circuit’s many articulations and inconsistent applications its choice-of-law rule); Roni A. 
Elias, Towards Solving the Problem of a Substantive-Law Circuit in a Regional Appellate 
System: How to Reform the Jurisdictional and Choice-of-Law Rules for the Federal Circuit 
to Promote Uniformity and Predictability in Patent Law, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 40, 65 (2016) (“Because these [choice-of-law] rules are complex and interdependent, 
it is not always clear during litigation in the district court which rules of law should apply.”). 
17 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, A Case Study, supra note 16, at 44–45 (suggesting that the Federal 
Circuit permit parties to sever issues “far removed from patent law,” try them separately, and 
appeal them to the regional circuits, and that the Federal Circuit apply its own law to all other 
issues appealed to it “in the same way that every other federal appellate court is permitted to 
construe open issues of federal law”); see also Moore, supra note 16, at 800 (considering the 
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule and its effects on the court’s ability to control the form 
of jury verdicts and proposing the court “apply its own law to all procedural issues arising in 
patent cases”); Karol, supra note 16, at 3 (suggesting the Federal Circuit apply its own law 
to procedural issues); Field, supra note 16, at 692–98 (suggesting the Federal Circuit “apply 
its own law to all procedural issues”). But see Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of 
Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1178–79 (1996) (proposing 
the Federal Circuit adopt a new choice-of-law rule, pursuant to which the court would defer 
to the regional circuit law on “procedural issues that have little or no impact on patent 
policy”). 
18 See Sean M. McEldowney, Comment, The “Essential Relationship” Spectrum: A 
Framework for Addressing Choice of Procedural Law in the Federal Circuit, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1639, 1673–76 (2005) (describing a “spectrum” of relationships between procedural 
and substantive patent law issues and suggesting the Federal Circuit contextualize issues 
along the spectrum). 
19 Adam E. Miller, Note, The Choice of Law Rules and the Use of Precedent in the 
Federal Circuit: A Unique and Evolving System, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 301, 328 (2006) 
(reviewing the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law case law and arguing for “clear guidance on 
what law to apply and when”). 
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manner in an effort to constrain judicial lawmaking. This Article therefore considers 
whether the court’s rule causes the court to treat substantively similar cases in a 
procedurally different—and non-transparent—manner and, in doing so, to engage in 
lawmaking that may be beyond the limits of its authority. Third, this Article 
contemplates solutions beyond a mere change in the court’s choice-of-law rule. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the background that gave 
birth to the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. It recounts the history of the Federal 
Circuit, explains the contours of the court’s unique jurisdiction, and describes the 
principle cases in which the court adopted and refined its rule. Part III undertakes a 
balanced consideration of the court’s rule, examining both its positive and negative 
attributes. But this evaluation, alone, does not reveal the rule’s relative worth. Part 
IV, therefore, examines the virtues and flaws of alternative choice-of-law rules. 
Finally, Part V concludes by considering structural solutions that could obviate the 
need for a choice-of-law rule altogether. 
 
II.  THE BIRTH OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE 
 
A.  The History of the Federal Circuit 
 
The Federal Circuit was established by the Federal Courts Improvement Act 
(“FCIA”) of 1982.20 Congress created the court in response to the findings of the 
Hruska Commission,21 which undertook to study the federal judiciary.22 Congress 
rejected the Commission’s primary recommendation of creating a National Court of 
Appeals, but it responded to a secondary finding that patent law presented a special 
problem.23 The Commission’s report noted that uniformity of patent law was a 
primary concern of practicing patent attorneys.24 The biggest perceived problem was 
intra- and inter-circuit conflicts that arose from differences in the application of the 
                                                   
20 Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(1982).  
21 The Commission’s formal name was the Commission on Revision of the Federal 
Court Appellate System, but it became known as the Hruska Commission because Senator 
Roman L. Hruska served as the Commission’s chairman. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF 
THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, as reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 196 (1975) [hereinafter 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE]; see also Jack B. Owens, Commentary, The Hruska 
Commission’s Proposed National Court of Appeals, 23 UCLA L. REV. 580, 580 (1976) 
(noting that the Commission was “undoubtedly to be known as the Hruska Commission”). 
22 See RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, supra note 21, at 207–08. 
23 See id. at 369–71 (noting that problems existed with patent adjudication). 
24 See id. at 370 (noting that patent consultants, Professor James B. Gambrell and 
Donald R. Dunner, indicated that their “collective experience” led them to believe that “the 
lack of uniformity in decisions on patent-related issues has been a widespread and continuing 
fact of life” and that the study “merely confirm[ed]” their judgment). 
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law.25 In addition, the report noted forum shopping was a concern.26 Moreover, what 
was ultimately lacking, the report suggested, was “guidance and monitoring by a 
single court whose judgments are nationally binding.” 27 The Supreme Court had 
failed to fill this role, so the report recommended the “creation of a national court.”28 
The legislative history of FCIA reflects these concerns. It reveals that a primary 
purpose of creating the Federal Circuit was to create uniformity in the field of patent 
law. The Senate Judiciary Committee explained that one of the primary purposes of 
FCIA was to address a congressionally-determined need for uniformity.29 The 
Committee traced a lack of uniformity to the inability of the decisions of any one 
court of appeals to be binding on the others.30 The creation of the Federal Circuit 
was meant to address this problem: “The establishment of the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit [ ] provides a forum that will increase doctrinal stability in the 
field of patent law.”31 A House Judiciary Committee Report similarly explained that 
“the central purpose [of the FCIA] is to reduce the widespread lack of uniformity 
and uncertainty of legal doctrine in the administration of patent law.”32 The 
Committee noted that patent litigation was characterized by “unsettling 
                                                   
25 See id. (reporting that forty-eight percent of respondents to a survey indicated that 
inter-circuit conflicts “was a cause of considerable impact on disputes involving patent-
related issues”); id. (“Analysis of the data suggested that ‘most of the problem lies in the 
intra- and inter-circuit conflicts which arise by virtue of the differences in applying the law 
to the facts in particular cases before the court.’”). 
26 See id. at 220 (“[T]he perceived disparity in results in different circuits leads to 
widespread forum shopping.”); id. at 370 (“‘[D]irectly attributable’ to differences in the 
interpretation of and application of the law are ‘forum disputes and the extensive forum 
shopping that goes on.’”). 
27 Id. at 371. 
28 Id. 
29 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 12; see also 
S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 4 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14 (“The creation of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit provides such a forum for appeals from 
throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special 
need for national uniformity.”). 
30 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13. The report 
explains, 
 
A decision in any one of the twelve regional circuits is not binding on any of the 
others. . . . Consequently, there are areas of the law in which the appellate courts 
reach inconsistent decision [sic] on the same issue, or in which—although the rule 
of law may be fairly clear—courts apply the law unevenly when faced with the 
facts of individual cases. The difficulty here is structural. Since the Supreme 
Court’s capacity to review cases cannot be enlarged significantly, the remedy lies 
in some reorganization at the intermediate appellate level . . . .  
 
Id.  
31 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15. 
32 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 23 (1981). 
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inconsistency in adjudications.”33 Conflicting decisions, both the Senate and the 
House Judiciary Committees noted, created uncertainty.34 In addition, both the 
Senate and the House Judiciary Committees noted that the creation of the Federal 
Circuit was meant to address the “acute” problem of forum shopping.35  
Finally, although lawmakers intended for the Federal Circuit to unify matters 
of patent law, Congress indicated that it did not intend to create a “specialized 
court,”36 as such. One of the reasons offered in support of the creation of the Federal 
Circuit was that deciding issue after issue of patent law would enable the judges of 
the Federal Circuit to hone their skills as patent law jurists and become efficient at 
deciding patent law issues. During a hearing related to the creation of the Federal 
Circuit, Howard Markey, who would later become the first Chief Judge of the 
Federal Circuit, explained, “[I]f I am doing brain surgery every day, day in and day 
out, chances are very good that I will do your brain surgery much quicker, or a 
number of them, than someone who does brain surgery once every couple of 
years.”37 However, as discussed in the next Section, Congress gave the Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction over a number of other types of disputes to prevent the costs of 
                                                   
33 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20 (1981). The legislative history also suggests lawmakers 
were concerned with uniformity in the “administration” of the law. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-
312 (1981) (“Even in circumstances in which there is no conflict as to the actual rule of law, 
the courts take such a great variety of approaches and attitudes toward the patent system that 
the application of the law to the facts of an individual case produces unevenness in the 
administration of the patent law.”); see also S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), as reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13 (“The creation of a new Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit . . . addresses these structural problems. . . . It improves the administration of the 
system by reducing the number of decision-making entities within the federal appellate 
system.”). Ultimately, however, uniformity in the administration of the law appears at bottom 
to be a concern about doctrinal uniformity. 
Congress did not find the “unsettling inconsistency in adjudication” of patent litigation 
any more troubling than other inconsistencies among circuits found in other areas of law. 
Hence, it is questionable whether the creation of the Federal Circuit is well justified. 
However, consideration of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
34 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (“[I]n a 
Commission survey of practitioners, the patent bar indicated that uncertainty created by the 
lack of national law precedent was a significant problem.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 21 
(1981) (“[T]he primary problem in this area is uncertainty which results from inconsistent 
application of the law to the facts of an individual case.”). 
35 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (“[T]he 
Commission singled out patent law as an area in which widespread forum-shopping is 
particularly acute.”); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–21 (1981) (“[T]he Commission found 
patent law to be an area in which widespread forum-shopping was particularly acute.”). 
36 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981) (“The proposed new court is not a ‘specialized 
court.’”). 
37 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and U.S. Claims Court, 1981: Hearing 
on H.R. 2405 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of 
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 42–43 (1981) (statement of the 
Honorable Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals). 
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specialization, such as capture by industry, a lack of cross-pollination among legal 
theories, and the prevention of the percolation of ideas.38 Thus, in creating the 
Federal Circuit, Congress intended to yield the benefits of specialized tribunals 
without the costs.39 
 
B.  The Federal Circuit’s Jurisdiction 
 
The Federal Circuit’s unique jurisdiction reflects these congressional 
objectives. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295, the Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction 
over final decisions from a number of specialized courts, such as the United States 
Court of Federal Claims40 and the United States Court of International Trade,41 as 
well as appeals relating to patent claims, so long as the patent claims satisfy the well-
pleaded complaint rule or are included in a compulsory counterclaim.42 Thus, 
                                                   
38 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 
379–80 [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication] (describing the costs of 
specialization). 
39 Id. at 404 (“Congress decided to create a new kind of specialized tribunal; one with 
the exclusivity necessary to achieve uniformity of patent law, the concentration of patent 
cases needed to develop expertise, and enough other business to prevent the court from 
succumbing to the dangers fostered by specialization.”). 
40 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2018). 
41 Id. § 1295(a)(5). 
42 Id. § 1295(a)(1). Section 1295(a)(1) specifically provides, “The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final 
decision of a district court of the United States . . . in any civil action arising under, or in any 
civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act 
of Congress relating to patents.”  
The Federal Circuit did not initially have jurisdiction over counterclaims pertaining to 
patent law. The first enacted version of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295 (1982), provided the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over appeals from final 
decisions of the district courts if the district court’s jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1338. See Federal Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 
96 Stat. 25, 37 (1982). Section 1338, in turn, provided that “the district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents.” 
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982). Consistent with Supreme Court cases construing the “arising 
under” language of the federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, see 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983), the Supreme 
Court construed the “arising under” language in §1338 to mean the Federal Circuit only had 
jurisdiction over patent claims on the face of the complaint; it did not, however, have 
appellate jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims pertaining to patent law, Christianson 
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 814–15 (1988). 
The Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute was eventually amended by the America 
Invents Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 
331–32 (2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1295(a) (2018)). The amended version of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(1) untethered the statute from § 1338—i.e., from the district court’s jurisdiction—
but incorporated the same “arising under” language. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) 
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because a patent claim can be brought in any of the United States federal district 
courts, with respect to decisions relating to patent law, the Federal Circuit can hear 
appeals from as many as ninety-four district courts. 
Importantly, in Atari, Inc. v. JSA Group, Inc.,43 the Federal Circuit interpreted 
its jurisdictional grant as extending to an entire case, not just to the “patent issues.”44 
Atari raised challenging questions of the breadth of the Federal Circuit’s appellate 
jurisdiction that are worth considering because of their implications for the Federal 
Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. The plaintiff, Atari, filed suit in the Northern District 
of Illinois, alleging contributory copyright infringement, patent infringement, and 
five non-patent claims.45 The plaintiff’s claims stemmed from the defendant’s 
advertising and sale of blank cartridges and a device designed to copy Atari games.46 
A few weeks after Atari filed suit, the district court granted Atari a preliminary 
injunction, enjoining the defendant from selling its blank cartridges; the purpose of 
the injunction was to protect Atari’s rights under the Copyright Act.47 The blank 
cartridges were also the subject of the patent infringement claims, so the injunction 
effectively enjoined some acts of patent infringement as well.48 
After the injunction was granted, Atari moved to separate the patent claim 
pursuant to Rule 42(b), which permits a court to order separate trials for one or more 
issues. The sole purpose of separating the patent claim was to attempt to direct the 
appeal of the copyright issue to the Seventh Circuit, rather than to the Federal Circuit 
                                                   
(1982), with 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018). Commentators and scholars have consequently 
construed the amended version of § 1295(a)(1) as incorporating the jurisdictional 
requirement that the patent-related action be on the face of a well-pleaded complaint. See, 
e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well-Pleaded Complaint, and Federal 
Jurisdiction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2004). 
In addition, under the amended version of § 1295(a)(1), the court now has jurisdiction 
over compulsory counterclaims “arising under” the patent laws, which likely also must 
comply with the well-pleaded complaint rule, or, as the Federal Circuit described in a case 
that pre-dated the amendment to its jurisdictional statute, the “well-pleaded counterclaim” 
rule. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle Ltd., 895 F.2d 
736, 742 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Thus, the court does not have jurisdiction over cases or 
counterclaims where patent law neither creates the cause of action or the compulsory 
counterclaim nor is a necessary element to the plaintiff’s well-pleaded claims or the 
defendant’s well-pleaded counterclaims. 
43 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
44 Id. at 1433–35 (describing “issue jurisdiction” and concluding that Congress rejected 
“issue jurisdiction” for the Federal Circuit); id. at 1436 (“Congress specifically rejected 
Atari’s present suggestion that this court should have only ‘issue’ jurisdiction and that 
appeals involving patent and non-patent issues should be bifurcated.”). 
45 Plaintiff’s other claims included a claim for unfair competition, deceptive trade 
practices, fraud, unfair competition under Illinois law, and misappropriation. Id. at 1424. 
46 See id.; Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 5, 7 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
47 Atari, 597 F. Supp. at 10. 
48 Id. at 7.  
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along with the patent claims.49 The defendant appealed the preliminary injunction to 
the Federal Circuit, and Atari filed a motion to transfer the appeal to the Seventh 
Circuit,50 claiming the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction.51 
The question before the Federal Circuit was the effect of the order separating 
the claims on the court’s jurisdiction.52 The Federal Circuit concluded that it had 
jurisdiction over the appeal. Section 1295, the court reasoned, grants the Federal 
Circuit exclusive appellate jurisdiction over appeals when the basis for the district 
court’s jurisdiction is that the case arises under patent law.53 In addition, because 
§ 1295 granted the Federal Circuit “arising under” jurisdiction, it granted the court 
jurisdiction over “cases,” not “issues.”54 The district court’s separation order did not 
affect the district court’s jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, did not affect the 
Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction.55 Thus, if, as in Atari, a suit brought before 
a federal district court included both a claim of copyright infringement and a claim 
of patent infringement, the Federal Circuit would have appellate jurisdiction over 
both claims.56 Likewise, even if a suit brought in federal court asserted claims both 
under state law—e.g., tort law—and federal patent law, the Federal Circuit would 
have appellate jurisdiction.57 
Yet, as will be discussed in the next section, despite determining that it had 
jurisdiction over entire “cases” and not merely “patent issues,” the Federal Circuit 
surprisingly concluded that it should apply the regional circuit’s precedent in some 
instances. 
 
C.  The Federal Circuit’s Adoption of Its Choice-of-Law Rule 
 
In the early days of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the court was confronted 
with determining which law it should apply, both because of its recent creation and 
because of its unique jurisdictional grant. Initially, the court concluded that it should 
adopt, as binding precedent, the law of its predecessors, the Court of Claims and the 
                                                   
49 Atari, 747 F.2d at 1425. 
50 Atari apparently sought to transfer the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. See id. 
at 1427. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 1426. 
53 Id. at 1429–30. 
54 Id. at 1429–31; id. at 1433 (“In creating this court’s jurisdiction, Congress had 
presented to it two choices: (a) granting this court appellate jurisdiction over only the patent 
issues in a case (‘issue jurisdiction’); or (b) granting this court appellate jurisdiction over the 
entire case (‘arising under’ jurisdiction). Congress specifically and unequivocally rejected 
the former and chose the latter.” (internal footnote omitted)); id. at 1435 (discussing “issue 
jurisdiction”). 
55 Id. at 1430. 
56 See id. 
57 See Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding the 
court had appellate jurisdiction over a case that no longer contained an issue of patent law 
but contained an issue of state tort law). 
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Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.58 However, in later decisions, the court 
considered or applied the law of the regional circuit in which the case originated.59 
The rationale for this practice, however, was not always clear.60 But, in at least one 
case, the court expressed a concern regarding issues the court described as “purely 
procedural” and the challenge that would arguably be presented to the various 
district courts if they had to apply regional circuit procedural law to the bulk of their 
cases but Federal Circuit procedural precedent to patent cases.61 
 
1.  Procedural Law 
 
Despite this occasional preoccupation with the appropriate precedent to apply, 
the Federal Circuit did not extensively consider the issue until its 1984 decision in 
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Manufacturing Co.62 The issue presented in 
Panduit was whether to disqualify a party’s counsel.63 Before addressing the 
substance of the issue, the court noted that it had to decide the “choice of law 
question.”64 The choice-of-law issue the court had in mind was not the typical 
choice-of-law issue—i.e., a horizontal choice among two or more states or nations 
as to which sovereign’s law should be applied, which is generally resolved by 
conducting a comparative analysis of the sovereigns’ laws and weighing the interests 
                                                   
58 See South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). 
59 See, e.g., American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1366–
67 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying Ninth Circuit law); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Med. 
Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc., 745 F.2d 1463, 1465–67 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (applying Ninth 
Circuit law); In re Int’l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., Inc., 739 F.2d 618, 620 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (applying Ninth Circuit law). 
60 See American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (considering, without 
explanation, the contours of the law of the Ninth Circuit, in which the case originated, in 
deciding issue of antitrust law). 
61 Int’l Med. Prosthetics Research Assocs., 739 F.2d at 620 (“Dealing daily with such 
procedural questions in all types of cases, a district court cannot and should not be asked to 
answer them one way when the appeal on the merits will go to the regional circuit in which 
the district court is located and in a different way when the appeal will come to this circuit.”). 
62 744 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
63 Id. at 1567–71. A preliminary issue presented to the Federal Circuit was whether the 
district court’s order disqualifying defendant’s counsel was appealable—and therefore 
whether the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over the appeal—in the first place. Id. at 1571. 
The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final decisions of the district 
court, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2018), and interlocutory orders that are appealable as of right, 
id. § 1292(a), (c). A decision disqualifying counsel, however, is not one of the enumerated 
interlocutory orders that are appealable as of right. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit noted 
that one of its predecessors, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, had concluded that an 
order granting a motion to disqualify counsel is an immediately appealable decision and 
concluded that such orders would similarly be immediately appealable to it. Panduit Corp v. 
All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
64 Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1572–73. 
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of each in applying their own law and adjudicating the claims at issue.65 Rather, the 
choice-of-law issue, as the Federal Circuit described it (and continues to describe 
it), is a choice between the law of the regional circuit court in which the case 
originated and the law of the Federal Circuit.66 
The purported “choice” arose, the Federal Circuit reasoned, from the court’s 
unique jurisdictional grant. Unlike the jurisdiction of the other twelve U.S. Courts 
of Appeals, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is defined substantively, rather than 
geographically.67 This unique jurisdictional grant, the Federal Circuit reasoned, 
creates a special challenge for practitioners and district courts.68 District courts 
presiding over patent cases are “bound by the substantive patent law” of the Federal 
Circuit.69 But when a case raises non-patent issues, “[t]he requirement to obey the 
law of its circuit causes practitioners and judges, in general, . . . to follow the 
‘general’ laws as set forth by their regional circuit court.”70 This “obedience” created 
a problem “possibly unforeseen by Congress.”71 Specifically, “[t]hat problem is 
which law must a district court apply in matters that are procedural in nature such 
as the attorney disqualification question.”72 If the case did not raise patent issues, the 
district court would be bound to apply the procedural law of the regional circuit 
                                                   
65 See Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08 (1981) (recognizing “that a set of 
facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in 
constitutional terms, application of the law of more than one jurisdiction” and, as a result, 
“the forum State may have to select one law from among the laws of several jurisdictions 
having some contact with the controversy” (citing Watson v. Emp’rs Liab. Assurance Corp., 
348 U.S. 66, 72–73 (1954))).  
66 Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1573. 
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018) (“The courts of appeals (other than the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the 
District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”); see also id. 
§ 1294(1) (“Except as provided in sections 1292(c) [Federal Circuit jurisdiction over 
interlocutory appeals from patent cases in the federal district courts], 1292(d) [Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from the International Trade Commission], 
and 1295 [exclusive Federal Court appellate jurisdiction], appeals from reviewable decisions 
of the district and territorial courts shall be taken to the courts of appeals as follows: (1) From 
a district court of the United States to the court of appeals for the circuit embracing the 
district.”). 
68 Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1573.  
69 Id. (“Since a district court is bound by the law of its circuit, a district court exercising 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338 is bound by the substantive patent law of this 
circuit. The requirement to obey the law of its circuit causes practitioners and district judges, 
in general, to follow the substantive patent law as set forth by this court in ‘patent’ 
cases . . . .”). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
2020] FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE 487 
court.73 But where the case also raises issues of patent law, the case is instead 
appealable to the Federal Circuit, and the district court would be bound to apply the 
procedural law of the Federal Circuit.74 The court explained that “[s]uch bifurcated 
decision-making”—presumably with respect to procedural law—“is not only 
contrary to the spirit of our enabling legislation but also the goal of the federal 
judicial system to minimize confusion and conflicts.”75 
The Federal Circuit’s enabling statute did not provide the court with any 
guidance with respect to this “choice” of law issue. However, the court considered 
the legislative history of that statute. Congress’s interest in creating uniformity in 
patent law,76 together with “Congress’s abhorrence of conflicts and confusion in the 
judicial system”77 and the practical challenge posed to practitioners and district court 
judges,78 lead the Federal Circuit to “rule, as a matter of policy, that the Federal 
Circuit shall review procedural matters, that are not unique to patent issues, under 
the law of the particular regional circuit court where appeals from the district court 
would normally lie.”79 Moreover, in instances in which the relevant regional circuit 
has not addressed the particular procedural issue before the Federal Circuit, the court 
seeks to “predict how that regional circuit would have decided the issue in light of 
the decisions of that circuit’s various district courts, [and] public policy”80—a 
process that, as other commentators have noted,81 strikingly resembles the 
methodology federal courts undertake to interpret and apply state substantive law 
consistent with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins82 and its progeny. In subsequent 
cases, the Federal Circuit has described its practice as a “rule of deference.”83 
                                                   
73 See id. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
76 Id. at 1573–74. 
77 Id. at 1574. 
78 See id. (“[P]ractitioners within the jurisdiction of a particular regional circuit court 
should not be required to practice law and to counsel clients in light of two different sets of 
law for an identical issue due to the different routes of appeal. An equal, if not more 
important, consideration is that district judges also should not be required to decide cases in 
this fashion.”). 
79 Id. at 1574–75 (emphasis added). 
80 Id. at 1575; see also Badalamenti v. Dunham’s, Inc., 896 F.2d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (“When the regional circuit court has spoken on a legal issue, we must apply the law 
as stated; if the regional circuit court has not spoken, we must predict how that court would 
decide the issue in light of such criteria as the decisions of that circuit’s district courts, other 
circuits’ decisions, and public policy.” (citing Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574–75)). 
81 See generally Schaffner, supra note 17; see also Karol, supra note 16, at 4 (describing 
it as a “‘reverse’ Erie analysis”). 
82 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
83 Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 457 F.3d 1279, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Biodex 
Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1991); cf. Beverly Hills Fan 
Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (concluding with respect 
to issue of personal jurisdiction that the Federal Circuit “owe[s] no special deference to 
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2.  Substantive Law 
 
A little more than six weeks after Panduit, the Federal Circuit adopted a similar 
policy with respect to non-patent substantive law issues in Atari, Inc. v. JS & A 
Group, Inc.84 Recall that, in Atari, the Federal Circuit concluded that its appellate 
jurisdiction extended to entire “cases,” not just “patent issues.”85 And therefore, the 
court concluded, it had appellate jurisdiction over a preliminary injunction 
pertaining to the plaintiff’s copyright claim that was joined with its patent claim.86 
Nonetheless, the court concluded that it should apply Seventh Circuit law in 
reviewing the district court’s injunctive order.87 The court reviewed a number of its 
earlier decisions, including Panduit, and concluded, “The freedom of the district 
courts to follow the guidance of their particular circuits in all but the substantive law 
fields assigned exclusively to this court is recognized in the foregoing opinions and 
in this case.”88 It explained, “It would be at best unfair to hold in this case that the 
district court, at risk of error, should have ‘served two masters’, or that it should 
have looked, Janus-like, in two directions in its conduct of that judicial process.”89 
The court was concerned that, if it required the district court to apply the law of more 
than one court of appeals, it would be saddling the district courts with a sort of 
duality, like Janus, the Roman god with two faces, one looking to the past, the other 
to the future (however inaccurate the analogy). 
Atari, therefore, gave birth to the second prong of the Federal Circuit’s 
policy90—i.e., that, in general, the Federal Circuit will defer to the law of the court 
of appeals from which a case originated on non-patent substantive issues. Panduit 
and Atari together, then, established the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule.91 
                                                   
regional circuit law” (citing Biodex, 946 F.2d at 855–59)). 
84 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
85 Id. at 1430, 1433–36; see also supra notes 46–56, and accompanying text. 
86 Id. at 1429–35. 
87 Id. at 1438–40. 
88 Id. at 1439 (emphasis added). 
89 Id. 
90 The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule as it relates to non-patent substantive law is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
91 The Federal Circuit does not only have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent 
cases. The Federal Circuit additionally has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the “Little Tucker Act,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which waives United States 
sovereign immunity and creates causes of action against the United States for various types 
of harms. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2). The Little Tucker Act specifically creates a cause of 
action for any claim against the United States that does not exceed $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346 (2018) (providing for concurrent jurisdiction in federal district courts and United 
States Court of Federal Claims for claims not exceeding $10,000). 
As with patent claims, Little Tucker Act claims can originate in any federal district 
court because the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is based on subject matter, not geography. 
Little Tucker Act claims may also originate in the United States Court of Federal Claims, 
with which the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See id.  
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* * * 
 
Since Panduit and Atari, the Federal Circuit has referred to its choice-of-law 
rule in dozens of cases.92 In many cases, the Federal Circuit has simply restated its 
choice-of-law rule without any further explication as to how it was discerning the 
line between “procedure” on the one hand, and “substance” on the other.93 In at least 
a couple of cases, the court acknowledged the challenge and attempted to articulate 
a rule that embodied the complexity of the relationship between substance and 
procedure.94 But the choice-of-law rule that emerged from these cases is incoherent 
and practically unworkable. 
For example, in Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc.,95 a case decided in 
1991, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that the Panduit “test” had been 
inconsistently articulated in the short six years since Panduit was decided.96 The 
                                                   
The Federal Circuit initially adopted its choice-of-law rule only with respect to cases 
arising under the patent laws. See Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 n.15 (“This ruling may be 
applicable to our review of district court decisions which do not involve patent claims. For 
example, cases involving the ‘Little Tucker Act.’ We need not and do not decide this 
question.” (internal citations omitted)). Subsequently, the court adopted the same rule with 
respect to cases arising under the Little Tucker Act. See Russell v. United States, 661 F.3d 
1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The question regarding whether and under what circumstances 
Mr. Russell can continue to represent putative class members even after his personal claim 
has become moot is a procedural question that is not unique to cases arising under the Little 
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). We therefore apply the law of the regional circuit—in 
this case the Ninth Circuit—to that question.”). A full consideration of the Federal Circuit’s 
choice-of-law rule with respect to the Little Tucker Act claims is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
92 See, e.g., Abbvie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 
1295 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Monsanto Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 748 F.3d 1189, 
1196 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2004); Manildra Milling Corp. v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc., 76 F.3d 1178, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
93 See, e.g., Abbvie Deutschland GmbH, 759 F.3d at 1295; Monsanto, 748 F.3d at 1196; 
Sulzer Textil, 358 F.3d at 1363; Manildra Milling Corp., 76 F.3d at 1181. 
94 See, e.g., Manildra Milling Corp., 76 F.3d at 1181–82 (explaining that deference to 
circuit law is inappropriate when interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Biodex 
Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 855–59 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (explained infra).  
95 946 F.2d 850 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
96 Id. at 854–55 (“[O]ur case law has not been clear on whether we should or must defer 
to the law of the regional circuit on this kind of issue.”); id. at 856 (“This test has been 
variously and inconstantly phrased.”). The court then reviewed some of its earlier 
articulations of the test: 
 
The court has recently stated the relevant test as whether the issue concerns a 
‘subject which is not unique to patent law,’ or which is ‘not specific to our 
statutory jurisdiction,’ in which event we have deferred. Alternatively, we have 
looked to whether the procedural issue may be ‘related’ to ‘substantive matters 
unique to the Federal Circuit’ and thus committed to our law. Furthermore, no 
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court additionally noted that language in Panduit “phrased the relevant line of 
demarcation in fluid language, noting that the resolution of the issue of deference in 
particular cases would depend on whether the procedural matter should ‘pertain to’ 
or be ‘related to patent issues [such that] they have a direct bearing on the 
outcome.’”97 
Biodex did not take this as an invitation to draw the line more clearly. Nor did 
the court attempt to outline a more workable approach. Instead, it described what 
amounts to a commitment to resolve patent controversies on a case-by-case basis: 
“Panduit did not engrave a fixed meaning to the terms ‘unique to,’ ‘related to,’ or 
‘pertain[ing] to,’ our exclusive statutory subject matter jurisdiction, but instead 
recognized that each case must be decided by reference to the core policy of not 
creating unnecessary conflicts and confusion in procedural matters.”98 Biodex, 
notably, does not consider the court’s mandate to create uniformity in patent law and 
how its decision would (or would not) further that goal. 
The impracticality and incoherence of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule 
would again become apparent in the court’s 1996 decision, Manildra Milling Corp. 
v. Ogilvie Mills, Inc.99 The Manildra court explained that it considers “several 
factors,” including whether there is a consensus among the regional circuits, the need 
to promote uniformity in patent law, and the “nature of the legal issue involved.”100 
In general, when there is uniformity among the regional circuits, the Federal Circuit 
has “conformed” its law to that of the other circuit courts.101 In addition, the court 
explained that, generally, where the “nature” of the “issue involves an interpretation 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” it defers to the regional circuit.102 The 
reason offered was “that such rules are integral to the routine conduct of trials, and 
                                                   
matter how phrased, this particular test has not always ended our inquiry. We have 
considered, secondarily, whether ‘most cases involving the issue will come on 
appeal to this court,’ thereby putting us in a ‘good position to create a uniform 
body of federal law’ on the issue. 
 
Id. at 856 (citations omitted). 
97 Id. at 857 (quoting Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 n.14 (alteration in original)). The 
Panduit footnote states in full: 
 
This policy is not inconsistent with our prior decisions in which procedural 
matters that do pertain to patent issues, such as whether proof of non-experimental 
use is necessary to establish a prima facie defense of an on-sale bar, must conform 
to Federal Circuit law. Since those procedural matters are related to patent issues, 
they have a direct bearing on the outcome of those determinations. 
 
Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 n.14 (citations omitted). 
98 Biodex, 946 F.2d at 857. 
99 76 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
100 Id. at 1181. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1181–82. 
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that practitioners and judges should be free to conduct litigation according to the 
rules that ordinarily apply to them.”103  
So, after Manildra, what is there? A multi-factored balancing test, that favors, 
but is not bounded by, uniformity with the regional circuits, especially where 
interpretation of a Federal Rule is involved, but that is also mindful of uniformity in 
patent trials and whether the procedural issue “relates to” or “pertains to” patent law, 
as well as the particular circumstances of the case at hand. How are district court 
judges, who must decide these sorts of issues in the first instance, supposed to apply 
this test? Unlike the court’s opinions in Panduit and Atari, which were concerned 
with the ease with which a district court could administer the law in the first instance, 
Manildra does not appear at all concerned with the administrability of the law. 
 
III.  A BALANCED CONSIDERATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S  
CHOICE-OF-LAW RULE 
 
In adopting its choice-of-law rule, the Federal Circuit considered a number of 
policy objectives reflected in the legislative history of the court’s enabling statute.104 
Those policy objectives include developing patent law in a uniform manner, 
discouraging forum shopping between the Federal Circuit and the regional circuit 
courts, and avoiding specialization of the Federal Circuit.105 In addition, the court 
was concerned with the rule’s administrability by the district courts.106 But the 
court’s analysis neither thoroughly considered the choice-of-law rule’s effects on 
those objectives nor fully appreciated the problems the rule might present. 
This Part aims to correct for these oversights by undertaking a thorough and 
balanced consideration of the court’s choice-of-law rule. Because the rule is 
articulated in terms of, and relies on, the substance-procedure dichotomy, the 
discussion begins by considering how the dichotomy affects the court’s application 
of its choice-of-law rule. The discussion then considers how the rule affects the 
court’s ability to develop and apply patent law in a uniform manner. These two 
concepts—the substance-procedure dichotomy and the uniformity of law—dovetail 
to suggest a third manner in which to evaluate the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law 
rule: the extent to which the rule enables the court to treat substantively similar cases 
procedurally differently, and to do so in a non-transparent manner. The discussion 
then evaluates the court’s rule for its effects on forum shopping, the specialization 
of the Federal Circuit, and, finally, the administrability of the chosen rule. 
  
                                                   
103 Id. at 1182. Despite the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule, the court ultimately 
declined to follow the law of the regional circuit, i.e., the Tenth Circuit. See id. 
104 The Federal Circuit’s enabling statute is the Federal Courts Improvement Act 
(FCIA) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).  
105 See supra Section II.A. 
106 See supra Section II.C(1), (2) (discussing the court’s rationale in Panduit and Atari).  
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A.  The Substance-Procedure Dichotomy 
 
The court’s choice-of-law rule requires the court to defer to the regional circuit 
courts on issues of procedural law but not on issues of substantive patent law. Thus, 
the court’s rule necessarily draws a line between “procedural law,” on the one hand, 
and “substantive law,” on the other. But as Biodex and Manildra reveal, drawing 
that line is not a simple task. Drawing such a line importantly presumes that there is 
a distinction between the two and is therefore dependent on the dichotomy between 
substance and procedure. But as scholars, commentators,107 and the Supreme 
Court108 have noted, the line between procedure and substance is a difficult one to 
draw. 
Nonetheless, one common way of drawing the line between law that is 
procedural versus law that is substantive is by identifying the type of conduct it 
regulates. Procedural law regulates litigation conduct and is “designed to make the 
process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes.”109 
Substantive law, in contrast, regulates primary conduct.110 
                                                   
107 See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1018–20 (2008); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 693, 724 (1974) (“We were all brought up on sophisticated talk about the 
fluidity of the line between substance and procedure. But the realization that the terms carry 
no monolithic meaning at once appropriate to all contexts in which courts have seen fit to 
employ them need not imply that they can have no meaning at all.” (internal footnotes 
omitted)); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2013) (“When a federal judge engages in heavy-handed case 
management or makes decisions about the proper bounds of a complex proceeding, it is not 
just the norms of judging but also the applicable liability policies that must guide her in that 
endeavor.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 51 (2010) (“Even Congress has 
learned the power of procedure and knows how to pursue or mask substantive aims in 
procedural dress.”); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a 
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 passim (1975) (discussing the complex relationship 
between substance and procedure). 
108 Because the Erie doctrine importantly relies on the substance-procedure dichotomy, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the Supreme Court has noted the difficulty in drawing the 
line between the two in cases articulating and construing that doctrine. See, e.g., Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (“The line between ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ shifts as 
the legal context changes.”); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938) (Reed, J., 
concurring) (“The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy . . . .” (citing 
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1 (1825))). 
109 Ely, supra note 107, at 724 (internal footnotes omitted); cf. Martinez, supra note 
107, at 1021 (“By ‘process’ or ‘procedure,’ I mean not only questions of procedure within 
courts and court like tribunals, but also broader questions about how to allocate the authority 
to make and apply law among different government actors, including judges, legislators, and 
executive officials.”). 
110 See Ely, supra note 107, at 725 (noting that “in attempting to give content to the 
notion of substance, the literature has focused on those rules of law which characteristically 
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These definitions roughly track those offered by the Federal Circuit in its 
Panduit decision. The court described procedure as “the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”111 And it 
defined substantive law as “relat[ing] to rights and duties which give rise to a cause 
of action.”112 
But in actuality, there is a sort of “fluidity of the line between substance and 
procedure.”113 “Far from being distinct, substance and procedure are deeply 
intertwined.”114 Some procedural rules and doctrines are aimed at advancing 
substantive ends.115 But even some that are arguably “procedural,” because they 
regulate litigation conduct and are aimed at the accurate and efficient application of 
the antecedent legal regime, necessitate, or at least permit, application in a manner 
that reflects the objectives of the substantive law. These sorts of issues are essentially 
compound; they are composed of both a procedural element and a substantive 
element.  
Consider, for example, the law regulating a transfer of venue. Under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404, the district court may transfer a case from a proper venue116 to “any other 
                                                   
and reasonably affect people’s conduct at the state of primary private activity,” but adding 
“the fostering and protection of certain states of mind” and “immunizing laws” to the 
definition of “substantive” as well (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Cover, supra 
note 107, at 721–22 (“The distinction [between procedure and substance] I have in mind is 
the familiar one between that which controls the conduct of litigation and that which controls 
social conduct outside the courtroom.”); Martinez, supra note 107, at 1020–21 (“[B]y 
‘substance’ I mean rules that control the primary conduct of human beings outside the 
litigation or lawmaking process.”). 
111 Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (per curiam). The Federal Circuit quoted Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 
(1941) for this definition. But as Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss has pointed out in her criticism 
of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule, Sibbach—and along with it, Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny—are aimed at serving different ends than the 
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. See Dreyfuss, A Case Study, supra note 16, at 39. Both 
the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule and the Erie doctrine are concerned with 
“developing rules that prevent forum shopping.” Id. But the Erie doctrine is additionally 
concerned with limiting the federal government’s ability to intrude on the prerogatives of the 
states. See id. And, consequently, the Erie doctrine has attempted to draw the line between 
substance and procedure in a manner that reflects these objectives. See id. The methodology 
that Sibbach and the Erie doctrine gave birth to are therefore not necessarily relevant. See id. 
That said, since its decision in Panduit, the Federal Circuit has cited to neither Sibbach nor 
Panduit for this same proposition. 
112 Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574 n.12. 
113 Ely, supra note 107, at 724.  
114 Martinez, supra note 107, at 1019. 
115 See, e.g., id. 
116 If venue is improper, then 28 U.S.C. § 1406 controls, and a district court must 
dismiss the case or transfer it to a district or division where the case could have been brought 
in the first place. 
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district or division where it might have been brought” if doing so is convenient for 
the parties and non-party witnesses and is “in the interest of justice.” Section 1404 
may be characterized as “procedural” in that it, together with the main venue statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1391, is meant to control the conduct of litigation. Specifically, together 
they control the venue in which a case may be brought and to which it may be 
transferred. 
Courts considering a motion for transfer generally engage in a two-step 
analysis. First, consistent with § 1404(a), they consider whether the venue to which 
the moving party wants to transfer the action is one in which the action could have 
been brought in the first instance—i.e., courts consider whether the transferee court 
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction over the 
action, as well as whether venue would have been proper.117 Second, they engage in 
a multi-factor balancing test that ultimately aims to consider whether transferring is 
convenient for the parties and non-party witnesses, as well as whether transferring 
serves the public interest.118 
This analysis might seem like a fairly straight-forward balancing test that is 
divorced from issues of patent law, or any substantive law for that matter. But 
judgments about substantive law issues underlie the analysis.119 In determining 
whether transferring is inconvenient for non-party witnesses, courts will consider 
whether transferring the action will result in a witness being outside the subpoena 
power of the court, thereby effectively rendering the witness unavailable for trial.120 
But considering the convenience (or inconvenience, as the case may be) to a non-
party witness necessarily raises the issue of whether the proposed witness is relevant 
to the claims at issue in the first place, or whether, alternatively, she was cherry-
picked merely for her relative distance to the transferee courthouse. 
For example, consider a case in which a plaintiff brings suit in Delaware for 
patent infringement. Early in the case, the defendant, relying on § 1404, seeks to 
transfer the case to the Northern District of California.121 In support of its motion to 
transfer, the defendant claims that the transferee venue would be more convenient 
                                                   
117 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2018). 
118 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3847 (4th ed. 2019). 
119 Cf. Martinez, supra note 107, at 1041 n.144 (noting that procedural rules, such as 
those relating to choice of venue, can have substantive effects or be motivated by substantive 
concerns). 
120 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c) (providing in part that a subpoena can command a non-
party to attend trial if the trial is within 100 miles from where the non-party resides, is 
employed, or regularly transacts business). 
121 Even though plaintiffs make the initial decision regarding in which forum to file 
their actions, both plaintiffs and defendants are permitted to move to transfer venue pursuant 
to section 1404(a). See generally Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (considering 
whether to apply law of the state of transferor court or transferee court where plaintiff, rather 
than defendant, moved for transfer). Nonetheless, for ease of discussion, it is assumed unless 
otherwise noted that the defendant is the moving party. 
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because the defendant’s proposed non-party witnesses reside in the Northern District 
of California. The non-party witnesses identified by the defendant are inventors of 
prior arts that arguably establish that the patent-in-suit was anticipated or is obvious. 
The weight a court should accord the inconvenience to these proposed witnesses 
should almost certainly turn on the court’s assessment of the relevancy of the prior 
art to the defendant’s patent invalidity defense. Otherwise, this part of the transfer 
analysis would be highly vulnerable to manipulation and effectively useless. All the 
defendant would need to do is propose inventors outside the court’s subpoena power 
as witnesses. 
And yet, in reviewing district court decisions to grant or deny motions to 
transfer, the Federal Circuit elides the substantive patent law issue, having already 
characterized it as a “procedural” issue. Consider In re Apple Inc.,122 in which the 
Federal Circuit accepted, without further examination or consideration, defendant 
Apple’s argument that the transferee forum was more convenient to its potential 
third-party witnesses.123 The defendant, Apple, sought to transfer the plaintiff’s 
patent infringement suit from the Eastern District of Texas to the Northern District 
of California, where “several prospective non-party witnesses” resided, including 
witnesses that had “relevant and material information.”124 The district court denied 
Apple’s motion to transfer.125 With respect to the convenience of the witnesses, the 
district court noted that neither Apple nor the plaintiff “provide[d] significant detail 
as to the information possessed by the identified witnesses, and neither suggest[ed] 
that they would require all the witnesses identified to actually attend trial.”126 Apple 
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus.127 The Federal Circuit granted 
                                                   
122 In re Apple, Inc., 581 Fed. Appx. 886 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
123 Id. at 889. 
124 Id. at 887. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 886. A defendant whose motion to transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) has been 
denied has a few choices with respect to having the district court’s decision reviewed. A 
defendant can either wait for a final judgment and appeal the district court’s transfer decision 
with any other appealable issues to the appropriate appellate court or seek interlocutory 
appellate review. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 118, at § 3855. The most popular 
method of interlocutory review is for the defendant to seek a writ of mandamus or of 
prohibition from the appropriate appellate court, directing the district court to vacate its 
initial order and enter a new order transferring the case. See id. 
Where the case does not raise issues of patent law, the appellate court can be different 
depending on the district court’s determination and the route taken by the defendant. Where 
the district court grants the motion to transfer, if the defendant waits for a final judgment, the 
issue is appealed to the circuit court that embraces the transferee court. See id. § 3901. But 
if the defendant instead seeks a writ of mandamus or prohibition (or any other form of 
interlocutory review), defendant must petition the appellate court that embraces the 
transferor court. See id. § 3855; see also id. § 3935 n.14. In contrast, where the district court 
denies the motion to transfer, the appellate court is the same, regardless of whether defendant 
waits for a final judgment or seeks a writ of mandamus. See id. § 3855. 
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the petition, concluding that the district court erred for a variety of reasons, including 
because “the district court failed to give proper weight to the convenience of the 
witnesses factor.”128 Judge Bryson, however, dissented, in part, because Apple failed 
to establish how its third-party witnesses “would be important to the issues at 
trial.”129 
The crux of the disagreement between the majority and the dissent is the extent 
to which the court should do a searching analysis of the relevancy of the parties’ 
witnesses. The majority confined its analysis to a review of the balancing of some 
evidence against other evidence.130 But the majority took at face value the relative 
weight each piece of evidence should be accorded.131 In doing so, the majority 
declined to make an independent judgment about the evidence’s importance to the 
underlying patent issue.132 The dissent, in contrast, reviewed both the balancing and 
relative weight of the evidence.133 Ultimately, the majority’s approach reveals a 
missed opportunity for the Federal Circuit to speak on an issue of substantive patent 
law clearly before it.134 
But the disagreement between the majority and the dissent also reveals the 
tenuousness of the substance-procedure dichotomy. A law like the venue transfer 
statute is articulated in terms that make no reference to the substantive law. It is 
therefore seemingly “procedural.” Nonetheless, a determination of whether to grant 
a party’s motion to transfer under the statute implicates considerations of the 
antecedent substantive law—in the case of Apple, specifically, patent law. It is 
therefore difficult to fully divorce the procedural issues from the substantive ones. 
Moreover, the majority and dissent’s disagreement reveals one of the dangers 
of the substance-procedure dichotomy. Rather than engaging in a first-order debate 
about the underlying substantive issue, decisionmakers will instead fix their 
attention on largely procedural debates. Thus, in Apple, the majority’s decision to 
                                                   
But when a case raises an issue of patent law, the appellate court is the same, regardless 
of whether the motion is granted or denied and regardless of whether the party waits for a 
final judgment or seeks a writ of mandamus. In all instances, the district court’s decision will 
be reviewed by the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(1) (2018) (providing for Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction over final judgments involving issues of patent law); WRIGHT & MILLER, 
supra note 118, at § 3903.1 & n.106. 
128 Apple, 581 Fed. Appx. at 888. 
129 Id. at 891 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
130 Id. at 887–88.  
131 Id. at 888–89.  
132 Id. at 893 (Bryson, J., dissenting).  
133 Id. at 890–93 (Bryson, J., dissenting).  
134 One explanation for the majority’s approach might be that, as discussed infra notes 
222–224, and accompanying text, the court was primarily concerned with correcting for the 
systemic problem created by the fact that the Fifth Circuit and Eastern District of Texas, in 
particular, were venues that were hospitable to non-practicing entity patent plaintiffs. Eager 
to transfer cases out of the Fifth Circuit, the majority may have therefore been uninterested 
in doing a careful inquiry into whether the Eastern District of Texas’s denial of the motion 
to transfer was justified. 
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grant the writ is seemingly a simple one regarding the weight of the evidence,135 but 
the dissent hints at the decision’s underlying substantive content, although it does 
not fully expose it.136 
To be sure, the danger of substantive law judgments disguised as procedural 
ones runs through all legal determinations with a procedural component. But the 
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule amplifies this risk. It adds a layer of complexity 
to the procedural issue, which can further obscure the substantive law determination. 
In re Barnes & Noble, Inc.,137 discussed in the Introduction, is illustrative. 
Barnes & Noble also concerned a defendant’s petition for writ of mandamus 
directing transfer of venue.138 The plaintiff, a patentholder, brought suit against 
Barnes & Noble in the Western District of Tennessee, where the plaintiff’s Chief 
Executive Officer and inventor resided, claiming Barnes & Noble’s popular Nook 
device infringed the plaintiff’s patent.139 The plaintiff, importantly, was a non-
practicing entity or, pejoratively, a patent “troll”—i.e., a patentholder that did not 
practice its own patents, but merely asserted them against others who arguably 
did.140 Barnes & Noble moved to transfer the action from the Western District of 
Tennessee to the Northern District of California, “where most of its activities related 
to the Nook® take place.”141 But the district court denied Barnes & Noble’s 
motion.142 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit denied Barnes & Noble’s petition, 
concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying its motion 
for transfer.143 
The court’s decision, however, was not unanimous. The disagreement between 
the majority and the dissent was over what precedent to apply. The majority felt 
bound to apply the Federal Circuit’s precedent pertaining to the Sixth Circuit, where 
the case originated.144 
                                                   
135 Of course, the same opportunity to make substantive law judgments in the guise of 
procedural law determinations exists in the first instance before the district court. The trial 
court could have decided that the plaintiff’s infringement claims were relatively strong and 
that Apple’s defense, without more evidence, was relatively weak. Not only would such a 
determination support a denial of Apple’s motion to transfer, but importantly it would have 
enabled the district court to maintain jurisdiction over the case and rule substantively on the 
claims at a later time. Cf. Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical 
Look at Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 16 
(2017) (noting that the Eastern District of Texas is less likely to grant motions to transfer). 
136 A related, subsidiary issue is that, by making a seemingly neutral “procedural” 
determination, judges can obscure value judgments about the underlying substantive legal 
issue. 
137 743 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
138 Id. at 1383. 
139 Id. at 1382. 
140 Id. at 1384. 
141 Id. at 1382. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 1383. 
144 See id. at 1383–84. 
 
498 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
In contrast, Judge Newman, dissenting, would have applied Federal Circuit 
precedent, which in turn had arguably applied the law of the Fifth Circuit.145 The 
law of the Sixth Circuit and Fifth Circuit differed in the quantum of showing the 
defendant had to make in order to overcome the plaintiff’s initial choice of venue.146 
The Fifth Circuit standard was an easier standard to meet; it simply required that the 
balance of factors outweigh plaintiff’s initial choice of venue.147 The Sixth Circuit, 
in contrast, required that the balance of factors “substantially” outweigh the 
plaintiff’s choice of venue.148 But the difference in the precedent was not merely in 
the quantum of showing. In Judge Newman’s view, there was a difference in how 
much weight to accord the plaintiff’s initial choice of venue that was tethered to a 
substantive issue of patent law but untethered to the particular balancing test of the 
relevant circuit court.149 The Federal Circuit’s application of Fifth Circuit precedent, 
Judge Newman noted, accorded the plaintiff’s choice of venue “minimal deference” 
when the plaintiff importantly was a non-practicing entity.150 In contrast, no Sixth 
Circuit precedent had considered how a non-practicing-entity plaintiff affected the 
balancing test to be applied under a § 1404(a) transfer analysis.151 But in Judge 
Newman’s opinion, the same “minimal deference” given to the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum in the prior cases appealed from the Fifth Circuit was justified in a case 
appealed from the Sixth Circuit.152 And thus, regardless of whether the defendant’s 
showing had to merely outweigh (Fifth Circuit) or rather “substantially” outweigh 
(Sixth Circuit) plaintiff’s choice of venue, the defendant had made the necessary 
showing because of how little deference the plaintiff’s choice should be accorded.153 
On the surface—at least as the majority describes it—the disagreement between 
the majority and the dissent appears to be simply about what precedent is controlling. 
But there may be a number of fundamental disagreements driving the majority’s and 
dissent’s positions. 
One possibility is that the underlying disagreement is ultimately about 
substantive patent law—specifically, about whether the rights and remedies of non-
practicing entities are, or ought to be, less extensive than those of practicing 
patentholders and whether patent law doctrines and remedies should accordingly be 
calibrated to reflect those differences.154 The dissent’s opinion suggests that such a 
                                                   
145 See id. at 1385 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1383–84. 
146 Id. at 1385. 
147 Id.  
148 See id. at 1384 (“Unlike the Sixth Circuit, . . . the Fifth Circuit has expressly held 
that . . . district courts err when they require that § 1404(a) factors ‘must substantially 
outweigh the plaintiff’s choice of venue.’” (quoting In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 
F.3d 304, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc))). 
149 Id. at 1385. 
150 Id. 
151 See id. at 1384. 
152 See id. at 1385. 
153 See id. 
154 See, e.g., John M. Golden, Patent Privateers: Private Enforcement’s Historical 
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calibration is warranted, whereas the majority’s opinion is consistent with a view 
that the rights and remedies of the two types of patentholders are on par with each 
other. 
Another possibility is that they disagree about whether it is justified to treat 
cases from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits differently, and if so, the justification for that 
disparate treatment. The majority’s opinion suggests that it appears to believe the 
disparate treatment is justified by the choice-of-law rule.155 In contrast, the dissent’s 
opinion suggests that it believes the disparate treatment is not justified because the 
patent-specific application of the venue transfer statute should be the same, 
regardless of the court of appeals in which the case originated.156 
It is also possible that the disagreement between the majority and the dissent 
extends to the very nature of the disagreement itself. They disagree about what they 
disagree about. The majority may view the disagreement as about the applicability 
of the choice-of-law rule, while the dissent may view the disagreement as about the 
appropriateness of crafting patent-specific procedural law. 
The reality is that it is hard to precisely pin down their respective positions. 
(Indeed, I suggest in Section III.C, below, that the majority may have an entirely 
different motivation for its disparate treatment of cases from the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits that is not at all apparent from the opinion.) Rather than directly and 
transparently consider how the rights and remedies afforded non-practicing entities 
supports or undermines the overarching objectives of the patent laws, the majority 
and dissent instead focus their discussion on the relevant precedent and controlling 
standard of an arguably procedural law. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law 
rule ensnares the court in the substance-procedure dichotomy’s difficult, if not 
unachievable, task of parsing substance from procedure. And, perhaps more 
importantly, it creates the same danger of obscuring substantive law determinations. 
 
                                                   
Survivors, 26 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 545, 592 (2013) (contending that patent policy debate 
benefits from considering non-practicing entities as private enforcers, rather than vilified 
“patent trolls,” because such a characterization reveals nature of patent law as private 
enforcement regime); Oskar Liivak & Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Right Not to Use in 
Property and Patent Law, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1437, 1481–83 (2013) (arguing that 
enforcing unused patents against independent inventors introduces a variety of harms “while 
generating few apparent offsetting benefits”); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: 
Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1609–14 (2009) 
(arguing that courts curtail rent-seeking by “non-innovating patent owners”); Henry E. 
Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2125–
27 (2009) (warning of risks to practicing entities posed by curtailing the right of non-
practicing entities to get injunctions); cf. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that whether a patentholder should be 
awarded a permanent injunction could turn on whether it is a non-practicing entity). 
155 Barnes & Noble, 743 F.3d at 1383–84. 
156 Id. at 1384–85 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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B.  Uniformity of Patent Law 
 
The shortcomings of the substance-procedure dichotomy—translated into risks 
and weaknesses of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule—have effects on the 
uniformity of patent law. Recall that one of the factors the Federal Circuit considered 
in adopting its choice-of-law rule was the rule’s effect on the court’s ability to 
develop substantive patent law in a uniform manner, consistent with congressional 
intent.157 The Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute, however, is completely silent 
with respect to what law the Federal Circuit should apply,158 as is the legislative 
history.159 
Consistent with the legislative history of the Federal Circuit’s enabling statute, 
the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule sought to achieve national (i.e., inter-circuit) 
uniformity of substantive patent law, as applied. But given the Federal Circuit’s 
choice-of-law rule’s deference to the regional circuits on issues of “procedural” law, 
“substantive” uniformity is closely tied up with the soundness of the substance-
procedure dichotomy. If legal issues, as well as the law relied upon to resolve those 
issues, lend themselves to easy characterization as “procedural” versus 
“substantive,” then uniformity can reasonably be aspired to. But if the distinction 
between the two is illusory, then the characterization of an issue as procedural, when, 
in fact, it is constituted of both procedural and substantive components, leads the 
court down the path of relying on the precedent of the regional circuit courts. When 
the procedural laws of those courts are, themselves, in disagreement, that procedural 
disuniformity can be translated into substantive disuniformity within the Federal 
Circuit. The end result may be that substantive patent law develops in circuit-
specific, disparate ways.160 
                                                   
157 See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (per curiam) (“This court was created, as contemplated by the Congress, to achieve 
uniformity and to reduce uncertainties in [patent law]. This court, thus, has a mandate to 
achieve uniformity in patent matters. . . . The possibility of different [procedural] 
requirements should be minimized especially where a dispute is totally unrelated to patent 
issues and the resolution of that dispute does not impinge on the goal of patent law 
uniformity.”). 
158 In this respect, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute is consistent with other 
jurisdictional statutes. Compare 28 U.S. § 1295 (2018) (Federal Circuit jurisdiction), with 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–1389 (jurisdiction of U.S. district courts). 
159 See S. REP. NO. 97-275 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11; H.R. REP. 
NO. 97-312 (1981); cf. David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American 
Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1225 & n.138 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, Processes of 
American Law] (noting that Congress “hardly ever specifies whether or how a bill’s 
legislative history can be used in interpretation” and providing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
as the only example in which Congress has specified what documents a court may consider). 
160 See TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1376–81 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(applying regional circuit law to the issue of whether the district court may appoint a 
technical advisor, even though the use of a technical advisor can affect the substantive 
determination insofar as the technical advisor may ultimately be making impermissible 
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Barnes & Noble illustrates this very concern. The disagreement between the 
majority and the dissent reveals that the application of regional circuit law yields 
different outcomes, depending on which circuit law is applied. More importantly, it 
reveals that the Federal Circuit’s venue jurisprudence is developing in separate, 
regional-circuit-specific silos with no concern for consistency across regional 
circuits. The Panduit court recognized that such inconsistencies were a possibility, 
noting that the choice-of-law rule it was adopting “could on occasion require this 
court to reach disparate results in procedural matters in light of disparate viewpoints 
from the regional circuit courts.”161 And in her Barnes & Noble dissent, Judge 
Newman criticized the majority’s decision for this very reason. She noted the 
reasons for transferring were just as compelling as they had been in the court’s 
earlier precedent, and she expressed concern over the internal inconsistency 
emerging in the court’s venue cases: “Consistency of judicial ruling is no less 
important in procedural and discretionary matters than in questions of substantive 
law.”162 
But what the Panduit court did not recognize is that these are not merely 
disparate results in procedural matters. These are, at the same time, disparate results 
in substantive patent law.163 The Federal Circuit’s precedents reviewing cases from 
                                                   
factual determinations and such erroneous determinations are difficult for appellate courts to 
detect); id. at 1381–82 (Dyk, J., concurring) (noting the risk a technical advisor may make 
impermissible factual determinations and the risk the appellate court will not detect such 
errors) (“I am concerned that district court judges may have a tendency to rely on technical 
advisors in summary judgment situations to resolve disputed issues of fact. Since we review 
the grant of summary judgment without deference, it can be argued that such excessive 
reliance would be harmless error. But appellate review is not always perfect, and, as a 
practical matter, ‘common sense dictates that the trial judge’s view will carry weight’ even 
where our review is de novo.”); see also TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., No. 02-262, 2002 
WL 32134118, at 1, 8, 14–20 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2002), petition for cert. filed (seeking 
certiorari, in part, because appointment of technical advisor is not permitted in other courts 
of appeals, namely, the Seventh, First, Third, and D.C. Circuits, and will lead to different 
results in different circuits) (“The Federal Circuit’s holding directly conflicts . . . with the 
purpose for which the Federal Circuit was created: to increase doctrinal stability in the field 
of patent law.”); cf. Field, supra note 16, at 663 (noting that the regional circuit courts have 
different standards for deciding motions for judgment as a matter of law—some applying a 
“liberal standard” and others applying a “strict standard”—which may be outcome 
determinative). 
161 Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575. 
162 In re Barnes & Noble, Inc., 743 F.3d 1381, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
163 Indeed, following Barnes & Noble, petitioner, Barnes & Noble, sought rehearing en 
banc, and a number of amici filed a brief in support of Barnes & Noble’s petition, arguing 
that the Federal Circuit should develop and apply its own law to the issue of venue transfer 
to accommodate the specific needs of patent law and to promote uniformity. See Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc: Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3–7, In re Apple Inc., 
562 Fed. Appx. 983 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-0156), 2014 WL 1668975, at *3–7. Amici 
noted: 
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the Fifth and the Sixth Circuits relating to venue transfer treat non-practicing-entity 
plaintiffs differently. Precedents reviewing cases from the Fifth Circuit discount the 
initial choice of venue of such plaintiffs, whereas precedents reviewing cases from 
the Sixth Circuit do not. The decision to treat such plaintiffs one way or another is 
ultimately a substantive law determination about the rights and remedies of non-
practicing entities, and that determination differs, depending on where a case is 
initially brought. These disparate substantive law determinations then stand, to be 
applied in other cases and other patent-law contexts or, at the very least, to further 
enable these sorts of disagreements about an underlying issue of substantive law to 
go unresolved. For example, since the Federal Circuit has decided Barnes & Noble, 
the court has indicated in at least a few opinions that non-practicing entities are not 
prevented from enforcing their patent rights simply because they do not practice 
them.164 At the same time, other opinions suggest that at least some judges on the 
Federal Circuit believe the remedies available to a patentholder may turn on the 
patentholder’s status as a non-practicing entity.165 The court’s views on the ability 
of non-practicing entities to enforce their patent rights, on the one hand, and the 
remedies afforded to such entities once they do enforce their rights, on the other, are 
not necessarily irreconcilable. But reconciling these views does necessitate a 
                                                   
 
Because the regional circuits lack appellate jurisdiction in patent cases, their 
jurisprudence has not and cannot evolve to take into account the venue challenges 
of patent litigation. . . . These regional circuits have adopted a series of legal 
principles—such as a presumption in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum—
that may make sense in the type of civil cases the regional circuits hear, but make 
little sense in a patent case brought by a holding company with no meaningful 
connection to the forum. A uniform and nationwide body of Federal Circuit law 
will allow this Court to tailor “the conveniences of parties and witnesses” and the 
“interest of justice” to the specific needs of patent infringement cases. 
 
Id. at 7, 2014 WL 1668975, at *7; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Emerson 
Elec. Co. v. E.D. Tex., 135 S. Ct. 339 (2014) (No. 14–44), 2014 WL 3492060, at *17 (“The 
divergent circuit law is driving divergent outcomes in patent cases.”).  
164 See Thermolife Int’l LLC v. GNC Corp., 922 F.3d 1347, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019) 
(“[T]he patent statute does not restrict enforceable patent rights to those who practice the 
patent.”); Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Impression Products, Inc., 816 F.3d 721, 743 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (“There is no good reason that a patentee that makes and sells the articles itself should 
be denied the ability that is guaranteed to a non-practicing-entity patentee.”); DDR Holdings, 
LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“NLG cites no case law 
suggesting that prevailing non-practicing entities are not entitled to pre-judgment interest.”). 
165 See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 801 F.3d 1352, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Reyna, J., concurring) (noting that the “traditional model” of granting injunctive relief “does 
not always apply, particularly when the patentee is a non-practicing entity”); see also I/P 
Engine, Inc. v. AOL Inc., 576 Fed. Appx. 982, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that the district 
court applied doctrine of laches to non-practicing entity that had acquired patents and then 
sought to enforce them). 
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normative theory of substantive law regarding the proper treatment of non-practicing 
entities. The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule further enables the court to avoid 
resolving these sorts of normative issues of patent law, which is at odds with 
Congress’s intent in creating the Federal Circuit in the first place. 
At the same time, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule seeks to maintain 
intra-circuit uniformity of procedural law within each of the regional circuits. By 
deferring to the regional circuits on issues that do not pertain to patent law, the 
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule may avoid creating intra-district-court 
“procedural” conflicts and prevent any confusion that might ensue from these 
conflicting decisions. A procedural issue will be decided similarly, regardless of 
whether it is appealed to the Federal Circuit or the regional circuit. The end result is 
consistency, both from one decision to another decided by the same district court 
and from one decision to another across district courts, within a given regional 
circuit. Concern for this sort of intra-circuit procedural consistency might explain 
the majority’s position in Barnes & Noble. The majority sought to apply Sixth 
Circuit precedent because the case originated in the Western District of Tennessee, 
located within the Sixth Circuit.166 The dissent, in contrast, was concerned with 
avoiding inter-circuit conflict because the issue, in Judge Newman’s view, was not 
merely one of procedural law; it implicated substantive patent law.167 Barnes & 
Noble thus illustrates that, at least in some instances, it is difficult for the Federal 
Circuit to preserve intra-circuit procedural uniformity without sacrificing inter-
circuit substantive patent law uniformity. 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule cannot avoid creating at 
least some intra-circuit procedural inconsistency within the regional circuit courts. 
The court’s decisions outlining its choice-of-law rule recognize that some procedural 
issues “pertain to,” are “unique to,” or are “related to” patent law and justify the 
court deciding the issue under the Federal Circuit’s precedent, rather than the 
regional circuit’s precedent.168 Insofar as the precedent of the Federal Circuit and 
the precedent of the regional circuits are inconsistent with each other and yield 
                                                   
166 See Barnes & Noble, 743 F.3d at 1383. 
167 Id. at 1385 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
168 See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. 
1984) (per curiam) (“We, therefore, rule, as a matter of policy, that the Federal Circuit shall 
review procedural matters, that are not unique to patent issues, under the law of the particular 
regional circuit court where appeals from the district court would normally lie.” (emphasis 
added)); see also Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“The Panduit court itself further phrased the relevant line of demarcation in fluid 
language, noting that the resolution of the issue of deference in particular cases would depend 
on whether the procedural matter should ‘pertain to’ or be ‘related to patent issues, [such 
that] they have a direct bearing on the outcome.’” (quoting Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 n.14)); 
id. (“In sum, Panduit did not engrave a fixed meaning to the terms ‘unique to,’ ‘related to,’ 
or ‘pertain[ing] to,’ our exclusive statutory subject matter jurisdiction, but instead recognized 
that each case must be decided by reference to the core policy of not creating unnecessary 
conflicts and confusion in procedural matters.”). 
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different results, cases raising issues of patent law and appealed to the Federal 
Circuit will be decided inconsistently with those not raising issues of patent law and 
appealed to the regional circuit court. 
For example, in Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc.,169 
the Federal Circuit reviewed a trial court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The case originated in the Southern District of Ohio, located 
in the Sixth Circuit.170 The court noted that the “generally recognized rule” requires 
application of a four-factor test171; however, there was not “uniform agreement on 
how the factors are applied in a given case.”172 The court treated “the application of 
the factors—that is, the determination of whether a preliminary injunction should be 
granted or denied—as a procedural issue.”173 And because the issue “involve[ed] 
substantive matters unique to the Federal Circuit,” the court applied its own law, 
which required the trial court to “weigh and measure each of the four factors against 
the other factors and against the magnitude of the relief requested.”174 This standard 
is different from the standard the Sixth Circuit typically applies.175 Chrysler Motor 
Corp. is accordingly inconsistent with other, non-patent cases originating in the 
Sixth Circuit. 
As this Article discusses further below, these differences should be justified on 
grounds of substantive law. But there will be differences all the same. 
 
                                                   
169 Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
170 See id. at 952. 
171 Id. In general, that four-factor test requires the party seeking the injunction to 
establish: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm, (3) the 
balance of hardships tips in favor of the party seeking the injunction, and (4) the issuance of 
an injunction is in the public’s interest. Id.  
172 Id. 
173 Id. It is debatable whether the issue of whether to grant or deny a preliminary 
injunction is “procedural,” rather than “remedial.” See Marcus, Processes of American Law, 
supra note 159, at 1197 & n.19 (describing the law pertaining to injunctions as “remedies 
law”). But the proper (or improper, as the case may be), characterization of the issue as 
procedural is less important than the disparate intra-circuit treatment of procedural issues, 
once they are characterized as such. 
174 Chrysler Motors Corp., 908 F.2d at 953. 
175 Under Sixth Circuit precedent, a district court considering a motion for a preliminary 
injunction must also consider four factors: 
 
(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; 
(2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; 
(3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and 
(4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction. 
 
Chabad of S. Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 432 (6th 
Cir. 2004). But those factors are simply balanced against each other. See id. 
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C.  The Trans-Substantivity Principle of Procedural Law and a Related Principle 
of Equity 
 
A concept closely related to the substance-procedure dichotomy is the trans-
substantivity principle of procedural law, which is the idea that a given procedural 
law should apply similarly across different substantive contexts. A related principle 
of equity suggests that substantively similar cases should be treated procedurally 
similarly. The Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule enables the court to depart from 
both principles and to do so in a non-transparent manner. 
Under the most common definition, a procedural law is “trans-substantive” if 
“in form and manner of application,” it “does not vary from one substantive context 
to the next.”176 For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general venue statute, provides 
that “[a] civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant 
resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located.”177 
It is an example of a trans-substantive law; with the exception of claims for which 
there is a substance-specific venue transfer statute, the general venue statute is meant 
to apply in the same manner, regardless of the underlying claims that are brought. 
In contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 1400 provides, in part, “[a]ny civil action for patent 
infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or 
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business”178; it applies to patent claims and is therefore a 
substance-specific venue statute. Trans-substantivity, therefore, is importantly 
contingent on the substance-procedure dichotomy, as it “requires some analytical 
separation between substance and procedure.”179 As Professor David Marcus has 
described it, “[t]he substance-procedure dichotomy could fairly be described as 
trans-substantivity’s jurisprudential prerequisite.”180 
A broad conception of trans-substantivity translates into treating cases 
procedurally alike, regardless of substantive or other practical differences.181 One 
way of understanding this broad conception is that it would require a uniform 
                                                   
176 Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1191; see also David 
Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) [hereinafter Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future] 
(“A procedural rule is trans-substantive if it applies equally to all cases regardless of 
substance.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the 
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1746 (1992) (“‘[T]rans-
substantivism’ requires that the same set of rules be applicable to all cases . . . .”); J. Maria 
Glover, The Supreme Court’s Non-“Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
1625, 1654 (2017) (“‘[T]ranssubstantive’ [is] a term classically defined to mean that the 
same procedural rules should apply, in the same way, across different substantive contexts.”).  
177 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (2018). 
178 Id. § 1400(b). 
179 Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future, supra note 176, at 380–81. 
180 Id. at 381. 
181 See Tidmarsh, supra note 176, at 1747. 
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application of a procedural law both within a substantive body of law and across 
multiple bodies of law. Thus, patent cases raising similar procedural issues would 
be treated similarly, as would patent cases and tort cases raising similar procedural 
issues. 
One justification offered for the trans-substantivity principle is that it serves as 
a restraint on judicial lawmaking in the face of concerns regarding the “legitimacy, 
competency, and effectiveness” of judges as lawmakers.182 Marcus argues that it 
prevents judges from “trespass[ing] on legislative terrain” by requiring that judges 
either develop procedural law uniformly or, alternatively, refrain from doing so and 
leave the legislature to address the issue.183 In addition, he suggests that judges are 
not competent to craft particularized procedural law because they lack the ability to 
discern problems at a systemic level, do not have the necessary expertise, and suffer 
from biases that are exacerbated by the litigation process.184 Furthermore, Marcus 
argues that courts suffer from a coordination problem that undermines their ability 
to effectively craft particularized procedural law: The multiplicity of decisionmakers 
(i.e., judges) at the trial court level make it difficult “to devise a single approach” 
and can give rise to intra-circuit inconsistencies, and, at the appellate court level, 
numerous decisionmakers give rise to circuit splits.185 
Others, however, have justified deviation from the trans-substantivity principle 
in a variety of contexts,186 while Professor Bob Bone has argued that the whole idea 
                                                   
182 See, e.g., Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1220, 1228, 1236, 
1248; Cover, supra note 107, at 735–36. Another justification offered is that trans-
substantive procedural laws—rules in particular—are flexible enough to accommodate new 
claims and theories of liability and, with them, the shifting needs of litigants. For example, 
Professor Geoffrey Hazard explained: 
 
The Federal Rules have been an effective instrument of social justice 
because they reduce the barriers to the formulation and proof of claims against the 
existing systems of authority. Formulation of new theories of legal rights is 
simpler, virtually by definition, under a pleading system that is not construed in 
terms of old legal categories, as was code pleading and common law pleading. 
Proof of new theories of liability likewise is simpler with the aid of comprehensive 
discovery. 
 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2246 (1989). 
183 See Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1228–30. 
184 Id. at 1230–31. 
185 Id. at 1232–33. 
186 See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and 
the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 45–56 (1994) 
(arguing for substance-specific discovery rules in products liability, antitrust, securities, 
§ 1983, employment discrimination, and class action suits); Glover, supra note 176, at 1656–
66 (contending that the Supreme Court’s substance-driven class action jurisprudence does 
not exceed Rules Enabling Act); Cover, supra note 107, at 734–35 (suggesting that courts 
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that procedural rules are trans-substantive in the first place is an illusion.187 No 
procedural rule, Bone argues, can be justified “exclusively by reference to 
procedural values”;188 instead, procedural rules must ultimately be justified by the 
substantive ends they serve, and because the substantive interests at stake vary from 
case to case, different procedural rules might consequently be called for.189 Professor 
Maria Glover makes a similar point, arguing that a court’s substance-specific—i.e., 
non-trans-substantive—applications of procedural law are within the scope of a 
court’s lawmaking authority, so long as they are justified on substantive grounds.190 
Glover points out that judges may legitimately engage in substantive, interstitial 
lawmaking: “[F]ederal courts are very much in the business of making, interpreting 
and providing content to federal rights.”191 But what courts may not do, she argues, 
is “interpret or apply substantive law differently from one procedural context to the 
next.”192 She calls this principle of judicial procedural lawmaking power the 
“principle of procedural symmetry.”193 She notes, “it is perfectly acceptable under 
the symmetry principle . . . for the same procedural rule to apply differently in 
different substantive contexts.”194 Thus, although procedural law need not create 
uniformity across substantive bodies of law, it can and should create uniformity 
within one substantive body of law. Two patent cases raising similar procedural 
issues would be treated similarly, and two tort cases raising similar procedural issues 
would be treated similarly, but it is not necessary for the patent cases to be treated 
like the tort cases. The suggestion of these scholars’ arguments is that judges may 
                                                   
may use Rule 23 to effectuate substantive ends); Tidmarsh, supra note 176, at 1791–1801, 
1805–06, 1808 (“[A] formal analysis of complex litigation dictates that some relaxation of 
the trans-substantive ideal will need to occur in order to accommodate the peculiar problem 
of complex cases.”). 
187 See Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundation of Litigation Reform, 86 
B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1160 (2006). 
188 See id. 
189 See id. at 1160–63, 1161 (“[T]he social benefit of procedure must always be 
measured in terms of the substantive values at stake.”). 
190 See Glover, supra note 176, at 1655–57; see also Cover, supra note 107, at 735 
(“The Rules Enabling Act might then be read to mean that the courts, in applying the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure or any subsequently enacted similar body of rules, may not forsake 
their responsibility to justify substantive impact in terms of substantive values. It would not 
be enough to point to Rule 23; one would have to justify invoking it.”); Bone, supra note 
187, at 1159 (“[Cover’s] deeper point was that sometimes the justification for a procedural 
choice necessarily had to take account of substantive policies, and in such cases, judges 
should explain their choices publicly and make the connection to substantive policy 
explicit.”). 
191 Glover, supra note 176, at 1656.  
192 Id. at 1657. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
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depart from the trans-substantivity principle as long as doing so is a legitimate 
exercise of judicial lawmaking.195 
Application of the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule causes divergence from 
both the trans-substantivity principle and Glover’s symmetry principle. But because 
of the Federal Circuit’s unique jurisdictional grant, divergence from the trans-
substantivity principle is justified, even on the terms offered by the principle’s 
proponents. However, it is the transgression from Glover’s symmetry principle that 
presents reason for concern. 
The Federal Circuit’s application of its choice-of-law rule explicitly 
contemplates a substance-specific application of some procedural rules or doctrines. 
Since the court first considered the choice-of-law issue in Panduit, it has recognized 
that there may be procedural matters that “pertain to” or are “related to” patent 
issues, and, in those cases, the court applies and develops its own law.196 Although 
it need not have done so, the court has implemented this rule by applying and 
developing its own law in a patent-specific manner. 
The balancing test the court applied in Chrysler Motor Corp. to determine 
whether to grant a preliminary injunction is one example of the court’s application 
of a patent-specific rule.197 Likewise, Judge Newman’s dissent in Barnes & Noble 
reflects the judgment that the issue of venue transfer pursuant to section 1404 
implicates issues of patent law and therefore justifies a departure from the regional-
specific procedural law. Judge Newman’s justification for according the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum only minimal deference appropriately turns on rationale pertinent 
to patent law—i.e., because the plaintiff was a non-practicing patentholder. 
Both Chrysler Motors Corp. and Judge Newman’s Barnes & Noble dissent 
procedurally treat cases differently because of issues of substantive law—i.e., 
because of issues pertinent to patent law. But because of the Federal Circuit’s unique 
jurisdiction, the court’s substance-specific crafting of procedural law does not 
present many of the concerns raised by critics of substance-specific procedural law. 
First, these sorts of divergences derive from permissible judgments about patent law. 
As a federal court, the Federal Circuit may engage in interstitial lawmaking with 
respect to the interpretation of, and rights and remedies provided by, federal laws.198 
And the Federal Circuit was created for the very purpose of interpreting and applying 
                                                   
195 This insight raises important questions about the full breadth of the judiciary’s 
lawmaking powers, an examination of which is beyond the scope of this Article, but which 
is worthy of further inquiry. 
196 Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (per curiam). 
197 Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 952–53 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (observing that application of factors in balancing test is a procedural issue 
and that Federal Circuit would apply its own law because question on appeal involved 
substantive patent matters). 
198 Cf. Glover, supra note 176, at 638–43 (discussing the Supreme Court’s interstitial 
lawmaking as a legitimate exercise of the Court’s authority and as an explanation for its non-
transsubstantive class action decisions). 
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patent law in a uniform manner. The court therefore has a particular mandate to 
engage in interstitial lawmaking with respect to patent law. This mandate lends 
legitimacy to the court’s creation of patent-specific procedural rules and law.199 
Second, because the Federal Circuit hears virtually all appeals raising an issue 
of patent law,200 it has a privileged vantage point. It can discern systemic, rather than 
merely unique, problems pertinent to patent law. In addition, this vantage point has 
enabled the court to acquire expertise pertaining to the way particularized rules may 
serve patent law’s needs. And because many of the parties and lawyers before the 
Federal Circuit are repeat players,201 they have an incentive to bring systemic issues 
to the court’s attention, including the effects of particular procedural laws and 
doctrines.202 The court, therefore, has the competency to craft patent-specific 
departures from otherwise trans-substantive procedural laws.203 
And third, because of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the patent laws, the court does not face the same sort of coordination 
problems that typically afflict federal courts crafting particularized rules. 
Specifically, the Federal Circuit can devise a single, patent-specific approach to 
procedural problems that can be implemented uniformly at the appellate level.204 
Thus, in some instances, the Federal Circuit’s decision to apply and develop its own 
patent-specific procedural law seems to be a legitimate exercise of the court’s power. 
But in other instances—where the court defers to the regional circuits on 
arguably procedural issues—the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule causes the 
court to treat substantively similar cases procedurally differently. And this 
divergence is not so easily justified. 
Consider again Barnes & Noble. The majority’s and dissent’s opinions reveal 
that, in at least some instances, the regional circuit procedural law differs in 
important respects. Indeed, in the case of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ venue-transfer 
precedents, they are actually inconsistent in two respects. It is useful to evaluate the 
                                                   
199 Cf. Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1228 (arguing that 
judges lack “lawmaking legitimacy” and, therefore, one justification for trans-substantivity 
is that it constrains judges from “trespass[ing] on legislative terrain”). 
200 See supra note 42.  
201 See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity 
Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1628 n.40 (2007) (noting that bias at the Federal Circuit 
is unlikely in part because parties that appear before court often “enjoy the advantages of 
repeat play” (quoting Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or 
Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1569 (2006))). 
202 Cf. Marcus, Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1191 (arguing that 
judges lack the competency to create substance-specific process doctrine because they are 
biased and receive asymmetrical information from litigants). 
203 Cf. id. at 1230–31 (arguing that judges lack the competency to craft substance-
specific process law and that trans-substantivity protects against “inexpert, biased decision-
making”). 
204 Cf. id. at 1232–33 (arguing that judges face a “coordination” problem in creating 
substance-specific process law because of the difficulties in “devis[ing] a single approach” 
to procedural problems and, among other things, the division among circuit courts of appeal). 
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two inconsistencies in isolation to identify the problem each presents and determine 
whether either can be justified. 
First, the two circuits differ in the quantum of showing a defendant must make 
in order to overcome a plaintiff’s initial choice of venue. This difference is, at least 
on its face, a difference that can be applied uniformly across all cases. In other 
words, the difference is seemingly trans-substantive. The Federal Circuit applies the 
same venue transfer standard to all claims—whether patent, tort, contract, or 
otherwise—that originate from the Fifth Circuit. And likewise, it applies the same 
venue transfer standard to all claims that originate from the Sixth Circuit. 
But a comparison between cases originating from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits 
and within one substantive body of law reveals the non-trans-substantive effect. 
Because of the difference in the two circuits’ standards, a case that includes patent 
claims originating in the Fifth Circuit is more likely to be transferred to another 
venue than a case that includes patent claims originating in the Sixth Circuit.205 In 
other words, cases that are substantively similar—because they include patent 
claims—are being treated procedurally differently. 
The question is whether this non-trans-substantive application of the venue 
transfer statute can be justified. Is the disparate application of the venue transfer 
statute a legitimate exercise of the Federal Circuit’s authority to engage in 
lawmaking? Perhaps. The disparate treatment of cases from the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits is not justified on grounds of patent law—i.e., it is not an interpretation of 
patent law that yields this disparate treatment. Nor is it an interpretation of the 
Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute that yields this different result.206 Indeed, it is 
purportedly not an interpretation of any statute at all. Rather, it is a “policy” decision 
by the Federal Circuit that justifies this disparate application of the venue transfer 
                                                   
205 Id. 
206 Were the non-trans-substantive application of the venue transfer statute the result of 
the court’s interpretation of its jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1295, the question would 
likely be an easier one. A jurisdictional statute is arguably “procedural.” See Marcus, The 
Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1223 (noting that, through their opinions, 
judges make procedural law, which includes law pertaining to federal subject matter 
jurisdiction). Thus, the disparate application of the venue transfer statute would be justified 
not on substantive grounds, but rather on procedural grounds. However, the justification 
would be related to a procedural law (the jurisdictional statute) other than the one being 
inconsistently applied (the venue transfer statute). Nonetheless, the obligation of determining 
the scope of a federal court’s jurisdiction has always been one given to the courts, 
themselves. See, e.g., Local 377, RWDSU, UFCW v. 1864 Tenants Ass’n, 533 F.3d 98, 99 
(2d Cir. 2008) (“The federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own 
jurisdiction.” (quoting Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 69 F.3d 650, 659 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(alteration omitted)); Micei Int’l. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (“Federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction and ‘every federal 
appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction . . . .” 
(quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986))); cf. United 
States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (“[I]t is familiar law that a federal court always has 
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”). 
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statute.207 This raises a question of whether the court was acting within its powers 
when it adopted its choice-of-law rule in the first place. Or, alternatively, whether 
the Federal Circuit’s adoption of the rule was an instance in which the court was 
“trespass[ing] on legislative terrain.”208 Although a full inquiry into the Federal 
Circuit’s lawmaking power is beyond the scope of this Article, as long as the court’s 
choice-of-law rule was within the court’s power, treating cases that originate from 
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits procedurally differently would be justified. What is 
important is that the court treats these cases differently in a transparent way that 
exposes the underlying policy determination that arguably justifies it. And, at least 
with respect to the disparate treatment resulting from the different quantum of 
showings, the Federal Circuit was transparent. 
But the venue transfer precedent relating to cases that originated from the Fifth 
and Sixth Circuits differ in a second respect. Certain types of patent plaintiffs—
specifically, non-practicing entities—are treated differently, depending on the 
circuit from which the case came. The Federal Circuit is less deferential to a 
plaintiff’s initial choice of forum when the plaintiff is a non-practicing entity and 
the case originated in the Fifth Circuit, rather than in the Sixth Circuit. 
This difference is, itself, actually composed of two discrete differences that can 
be disentangled from each other. The first is that non-practicing-entity-patent 
plaintiffs are treated differently than other types of plaintiffs. As discussed above, 
this difference can be justified on grounds of substantive patent law—i.e., patent law 
should not accord the same rights and remedies to certain types of plaintiffs.209 And 
it is therefore a permissible exercise of the Federal Circuit’s substantive lawmaking 
powers. 
The second difference is that non-practicing-entity-patent plaintiffs from the 
Fifth Circuit are treated differently than non-practicing-entity-patent plaintiffs from 
the Sixth Circuit. In other words, the Federal Circuit treats substantively similar 
cases (patent cases involving plaintiffs that are non-practicing entities) procedurally 
differently.210 It is this second difference that is difficult to justify. It is not justified 
on grounds of patent law. There is no reason, under patent law, to treat certain patent 
plaintiffs who file suit in the Fifth Circuit differently from those same types of patent 
plaintiffs who file suit in the Sixth Circuit. 
But perhaps it is justified on grounds of the court’s broader lawmaking 
authority. This authority would have arguably empowered the court to adopt its 
choice-of-law rule. And this choice-of-law rule, in turn, would have enabled the 
court to apply the disparate law of the regional circuits. But an examination of the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Federal Circuits’ precedents suggests that the court’s disparate 
                                                   
207 See Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (per curiam).  
208 Marcus, The Processes of American Law, supra note 159, at 1228. 
209 See supra Section III.B.  
210 See In re Barnes & Noble, Inc., 743 F.3d 1381, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 
512 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
treatment is not so justified. It is not the Fifth Circuit that treats non-practicing 
entities differently from other plaintiffs. Rather, it is the Federal Circuit that does so. 
In each of two different cases that predate Barnes & Noble and that originate in 
the Fifth Circuit, a defendant sought a writ of mandamus, directing the Eastern 
District of Texas to vacate its order denying a motion to transfer and to transfer the 
case to the defendant’s chosen venue.211 In each case, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that the writ of mandamus should be granted and the action transferred because the 
plaintiff had merely a fabricated connection to the forum in which it had initially 
filed suit.212 Although both plaintiffs had offices in the Eastern District of Texas, 
neither plaintiff actually had employees there.213 But in reaching these decisions, the 
Federal Circuit was not applying Fifth Circuit law.214 Sure, in stating the standard 
that was generally applicable to issues of venue transfer, the Federal Circuit relied 
on Fifth Circuit law.215 But the issue of how to treat a plaintiff who did not practice 
its patents was not an issue ever addressed by the Fifth Circuit’s precedent.216 
Instead, it was an issue first identified by the Federal Circuit. Thus, it is not the 
Federal Circuit’s strict adherence to its choice-of-law rule that yields different 
treatment of certain types of patent plaintiffs. 
So, what was the justification for treating non-practicing entities differently in 
the Fifth Circuit? One possibility is that the Federal Circuit’s earlier cases 
originating in the Fifth Circuit had, indeed, applied the venue transfer statute in a 
substance-specific way. But because of the court’s choice-of-law rule and prior 
decisions characterizing issues of venue as “procedural,” the court departed from the 
trans-substantivity principle sub silentio. The disagreement in Barnes & Noble 
might then be understood as whether it was proper for prior panels of the Federal 
Circuit to depart from the trans-substantivity principle, the precepts of the court’s 
choice-of-law rule, or both. But regardless of the answers to those questions, if those 
earlier cases from the Fifth Circuit were, indeed, initially justified on grounds of 
patent law, the court’s venue transfer decisions, as a whole—including decisions 
from the Fifth Circuit and the other courts of appeals—are likely an illegitimate 
exercise of the court’s lawmaking authority. Or, to state it in terms of Glover’s 
symmetry principle, the Federal Circuit is impermissibly interpreting or applying 
substantive patent law differently from one procedural context to the next. 
Another possibility is that the Federal Circuit’s earlier venue transfer decisions 
reflect not a judgment about substantive patent law, but rather something about the 
                                                   
211 See In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re 
Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
212 See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1382 (granting writ in part because “the only connection 
between this case and the plaintiff’s chosen forum is a legal fiction”); Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 
1365 (granting writ because plaintiff’s connection to forum was “a construct for litigation 
and appeared to exist for no other purpose than to manipulate venue”).  
213 See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1381; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1365. 
214 See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1381; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1364–65. 
215 See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1380; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1363. 
216 See Zimmer, 609 F.3d at 1380; Microsoft, 630 F.3d at 1363. 
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Fifth Circuit and the Eastern District of Texas more specifically. The Eastern District 
of Texas has earned the reputation of being a venue hospitable to patent plaintiffs, 
particularly plaintiffs that are non-practicing entities.217 The district’s popularity 
stems from multiple factors, including the accelerated timing of discovery, the 
extended time to respond to motions to transfer and reluctance to grant such motions, 
the timing of claim construction hearings relative to discovery, and the Federal 
Circuit’s exercise of its discretion in a manner that dampens the effects of legislative 
reforms and the commands of Supreme Court rulings.218 The Eastern District of 
Texas and the patent system, more generally, have come under attack, in part 
because of the ability of non-practicing-entity-patent plaintiffs to control the 
litigation in such a meaningful way simply by bringing suit in one forum over 
another.219 The Federal Circuit’s earlier decisions ordering a transfer from the 
Eastern District of Texas may ultimately have been an effort to send a message to 
the Eastern District of Texas and address these systemic issues. 
It is questionable whether the Federal Circuit’s lawmaking authority embraces 
addressing these sorts of systemic problems. Because these problems are the result 
of a variety of different failures in the litigation process, correcting them is likely 
best addressed by Congress. And indeed, legislation that aimed to ameliorate these 
problems by limiting where patent suits could be brought was introduced in 2016.220 
That said, the legislation appears to have died in the Senate Judiciary Committee.221 
In the face of such system failures, including the failure of Congress to appropriately 
address weaknesses in the litigation process, perhaps appellate review by the Federal 
Circuit seemed like the only hope of addressing them.222 
                                                   
217 See, e.g., Love & Yoon, supra note 135 passim (evaluating the reasons why the 
Eastern District of Texas is so popular among plaintiffs and concluding that it is generally 
plaintiff friendly, although there are other rationale explaining the district’s popularity). 
218 See id. at 16, 21–34. 
219 See id. at 23–24 (“[T]he relative timing of discovery, transfer, and Markman ensures 
that, by virtue of being sued in the Eastern District, an accused infringer will be forced to 
incur large discovery costs, regardless of the case’s connection to East Texas or the merits 
of its noninfringement contentions.”). 
220 Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. 
(2016). 
221 An examination of the bill’s history indicates that the bill’s referral to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee was the last action. Id. 
222 It is worth noting that, in 2017, the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland LLC v. 
Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017), which may have curtailed a patent 
troll’s ability to bring suit against a defendant in the Eastern District of Texas. TC Heartland 
considered the definition of the word “resides” in the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(b). Id. at 1516–17. The Court concluded that “resides” in that statute meant “State of 
incorporation.” Id. at 1517, 1521. The Court’s decision overturned prior precedent of the 
Federal Circuit, which had held that “resides” in the patent venue statute meant the same 
thing as “resides” in the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (c). See id. at 1519–
20 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s precedent, including VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas 
Appliance Co., 917 F. 2d 1574 (1990)). The definition of “resides” in the general venue 
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Of course, this is all speculation about the court’s “true” rationale for its 
disparate treatment of non-practicing-entity-patent plaintiffs from the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits. The reason for this speculation is that the only rationale provided—
adherence to the court’s choice-of-law rule—neither fully explains nor justifies the 
court’s decision. And any other rationale is not provided. It is this lack of 
transparency that is perhaps what is most concerning about the court’s decision. It 
deprives the Supreme Court, Congress, practitioners, and the public of an 
opportunity to contemplate the court’s reasons and assess the legitimacy of its 
lawmaking in light of the rationale provided. 
The implications of this analysis are twofold. First, and most importantly, the 
court’s choice-of-law rule is serving as a mechanism to obscure substantive 
judgments, whether about patent law, systemic concerns in federal court 
adjudication, or other issues. It adds another decisional rule to the calculus of 
deciding cases. And the interpretation, accommodation, and application of that rule 
create both an opportunity for confusion and a refuge in which determinations that 
are difficult—because, for example, they are politically polarizing or at the outer 
bounds of the court’s lawmaking authority—can “hide out.” The second implication 
flows from the first. By obscuring substantive determinations, the choice-of-law rule 
provides the court with a mechanism that enables it to depart from its prior 
determinations. These departures, in turn, undermine the court’s objective of 
developing patent law in a uniform manner. 
 
D.  Forum Shopping 
 
One of the motivations for the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule was to 
discourage forum shopping. Recall that, in Atari, the plaintiff brought suit in the 
Northern District of Illinois, raising claims under patent law as well as copyright 
                                                   
statute permits plaintiffs to bring suit against a defendant in any judicial district in which the 
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1519; see also 28 U.S.C. § l391(a), (c) 
(2018). Because many large corporations sell products all over the United States, they are 
subject to personal jurisdiction in most, if not all, judicial districts in the United States. As a 
result, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the patent venue statute enabled patent plaintiffs 
to bring suit against patent defendants virtually anywhere they wanted, and especially the 
Eastern District of Texas. The Supreme Court’s rejection of the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of “resides” in the patent venue statute prevents patent plaintiffs from bringing 
suit against patent defendants virtually anywhere they want and, therefore, arguably 
corrected for the systemic problem potentially underlying Barnes & Noble. The patent venue 
statute, however, also permits a patent plaintiff to bring suit against a defendant in the judicial 
district “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business,” 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), and the meaning of that phrase is not 
entirely clear and is continuing to be debated. 
But the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in TC Heartland may have, at least 
partially, corrected for the specific, systemic concern underlying Barnes & Noble should not 
distract from the more general problems created by court’s choice-of-law rule, which persist 
even after TC Heartland. 
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law.223 The district court preliminarily enjoined the defendant from contributory 
copyright infringement, and the defendant appealed the district court’s order to the 
Federal Circuit.224 The plaintiff responded by filing a motion to transfer the appeal 
from the Federal Circuit to the Seventh Circuit,225 where, but for the patent claims, 
the plaintiff’s suit otherwise would have been appealed. The Federal Circuit denied 
the plaintiff’s motion, concluding that its jurisdiction extended over an entire case, 
not just “patent issues.”226 But the court extended its choice-of-law rule to 
substantive issues and concluded that the Seventh Circuit’s precedent should apply 
to the substantive issue of contributory copyright infringement.227 
Part of the Federal Circuit’s rationale for both its interpretation of its 
jurisdictional statute, as well as its adoption of its choice-of-law rule, was the desire 
to discourage plaintiffs from “appellate forum shopping.” The legislative history of 
the court’s enabling statute reveals Congress’s concern with a party adding “trivial 
patent claims” in order to “manipulate appellate jurisdiction.”228 In other words, 
Congress aimed to prevent regional-circuit-/Federal-Circuit- appellate forum 
shopping. The court’s choice-of-law rule sought to prevent this sort of “game.”229 
By deferring to the law of the regional circuit on issues not pertinent to substantive 
patent law, the court’s choice-of-law rule would deter a plaintiff from adding patent 
claims simply to escape the law of the circuit court that would otherwise apply. 
Although the court’s opinion articulated its choice-of-law rule with respect to non-
patent substantive law, its reasoning applies equally to the court’s rule as to 
procedural law. 
Considered alone, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule is reasonably 
designed to prevent this type of appellate forum shopping. It provides a plaintiff no 
incentive to join patent claims to its suit because, regardless of whether a suit 
contains patent claims, the regional circuit’s procedural law applies. In addition, 
even as applied, the rule is narrowly drawn such that the Federal Circuit attempts to 
apply its own precedent only to issues actually implicating patent law. For example, 
the court has consistently applied Federal Circuit precedent to issues of personal 
jurisdiction that are “intimately involved with the substance of the patent laws.”230 
                                                   
223 Atari Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
224 Id. at 1424, 1427. 
225 See id. at 1427. 
226 See id. at 1440. 
227 See id. 
228 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 20 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 30. 
229 See Atari, 747 F.2d at 1437–38 (discussing forum shopping and noting “[f]orum 
shopping is a game at which two can play”). 
230 See Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1654–65 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994) (concluding that the Federal Circuit should develop and apply its own law relating 
to personal jurisdiction based on stream of commerce theory because the issue of personal 
jurisdiction “is a critical determinant of whether and in what forum a patentee can seek 
redress for infringement of its rights” and there was no apparent uniformity on the issue in 
the regional circuit courts); see also Electronics For Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 
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But for the court’s practice, there could be an opportunity for manipulation. A 
plaintiff could strategically join a patent claim to her suit just to secure the Federal 
Circuit’s personal jurisdiction precedent for her entire case, if such precedent were 
more favorable to the plaintiff’s suit than the regional circuit precedent that would 
otherwise apply. But the Federal Circuit has attempted to prevent this sort of 
manipulative joining of patent claims by applying its personal jurisdiction precedent 
only to jurisdictional inquiries related to the underlying patent claims.231 
However, the Federal Circuit expressed no concern for regional-
circuit/regional-circuit forum shopping. Yet, the legislative history of the court’s 
enabling statute reveals that Congress was also concerned with this type of forum 
shopping. Congress vested the Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over 
patent appeals for the very purpose of removing any incentive plaintiffs might have 
for choosing one forum over another for what might be perceived as more favorable 
patent law.232 The Federal Circuit’s rule does not discourage this sort of forum 
shopping at the trial court level, at least with respect to non-patent issues. Under the 
court’s rule, regional circuit non-patent procedural law continues to apply. A 
plaintiff therefore has every incentive to file suit in a circuit that has procedural law 
favorable to its claims. In this respect, the court’s rule is seemingly neutral; it does 
not appear to change a party’s incentives to file suit in one circuit over another. But 
because of the falsity of the substance-procedure dichotomy and the court’s 
disuniform application of procedural law in a substance-specific manner, the court’s 
rule further encourages plaintiffs to choose a particular forum for the way that 
forum’s procedural law interacts with patent law. For example, after Barnes & 
Noble, a plaintiff that is a non-practicing entity would be better served to bring suit 
in the Sixth Circuit, rather than the Fifth Circuit. The plaintiff’s initial choice of 
forum is more likely to be respected in the Sixth Circuit both because of the Sixth 
Circuit’s relatively more difficult standard for justifying a transfer of venue and 
because embedded in the balancing test is a judgment that a non-practicing entity 
plaintiff is entitled to the same rights and remedies as a patentholder that practices 
its patents.233 
To be sure, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule is likely not the only factor 
contributing to forum shopping. Federal district courts may adopt their own local 
rules,234 and many adopt patent-specific rules.235 In addition, some individual judges 
                                                   
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
231 See Electronics for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1348 (applying Federal Circuit precedent 
to jurisdictional inquiry related to patent invalidity claim and applying Ninth Circuit 
precedent to state law misappropriation of trade secret and contract claims). 
232 See S. REP. NO. 97–275, at 19 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29 
(“This measure is intended to alleviate the serious problems of forums [sic] shopping among 
the regional courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one 
court of appeals.”). 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 137–56.  
234 See FED. R. CIV. P. 83. 
235 See, e.g., E.D. Tex. Patent Rules, http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=patent-rules 
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have adopted their own patent rules.236 These local rules are far from uniform.237 
Consequently, these rules serve as a basis for forum shopping.238 In addition, if a 
plaintiff’s suit includes non-patent claims arising under federal law, consideration 
of the applicable regional circuit law likely affects the plaintiff’s analysis as well. 
Other considerations related to personal jurisdiction, venue, and traditional choice-
of-law concerns may additionally influence a plaintiff to choose one forum over 
another. None of these additional factors, however, should distract from the fact that 
the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule may well contribute to forum shopping, at 
least as between the regional circuits. 
 
E.  Specialization of the Federal Circuit 
 
The legislative history of the Federal Circuit’s enabling statute makes clear that 
Congress did not intend the Federal Circuit to be a “specialized court.” Indeed, both 
the House and Senate Reports explicitly state that Congress was not creating a 
                                                   
[https://perma.cc/TMR2-Q2AW]; N. D. Cal. Patent Rules, https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/ 
localrules/patent [https://perma.cc/V749-QJ6P]; E.D. Va. Patent Rules, http://www.vaed.us 
courts.gov/localrules/ LocalRulesEDVA.pdf [https://perma.cc/698G-ZN2K]. 
236 See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 63, 66 (2015). These judge-specific local patent rules have been characterized as “local-
local patent rules.” See id.; see also Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. 
REV. 51, 56 (1997) (noting that local rules, including standing orders, are sometimes referred 
to as “local local rules”). 
237 As with procedural law, more generally, both the design and application of local 
patent rules can reflect a judgment about the underlying substantive law. Recognizing the 
“close relationship” between local patent rules and the enforcement of substantive patent 
law, the Federal Circuit applies its own precedent when reviewing the validity, interpretation, 
and application of these rules. See 02 Micro Intern. Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 
F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he local rules in question are not only unique to patent 
cases but also are likely to directly affect the substantive patent law theories that may be 
presented at trial, being designed specifically to require parties to crystallize their theories of 
the case early in the litigation so as to prevent the shifting sands approach to claim 
construction. Under such circumstances we conclude that issues concerning the validity and 
interpretation of such local rules are intimately involved in the substance of enforcement of 
the patent right and must be governed by the law of this circuit.” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)). But the Federal Circuit is “very deferential,” Safeclick, L.L.C. v. Visa 
Intern. Serv. Ass’n, 2006 WL 3017347, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 23, 2006), to the district courts 
with respect to these rules, and, accordingly, its review of them has not yielded uniformity 
across all local rules.  
238 See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 236, at 95–102 (arguing that local patent rules 
“undermine uniformity in patent law” because they have a number of differences between 
them, and arguing for a national set of procedural rules); cf. Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and 
Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas 
as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 209, 226 (2007) 
(arguing that one of the reasons why patent holders prefer the Eastern District of Texas was 
the district’s local patent rules, and suggesting national rules of procedure for patent suits). 
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specialized court.239 To ensure against specialization, Congress granted the Federal 
Circuit jurisdiction over not only patent appeals, but also “a varied docket spanning 
a broad range of legal issues and types of cases.”240 The Federal Circuit “inherit[ed] 
all the appellate jurisdiction” of its two predecessor courts.241 Thus, the Federal 
Circuit has jurisdiction over all patent appeals from all federal district courts and the 
Patent and Trademark Office, and it has the power to hear appeals in suits against 
the government for damages or for the refund of federal taxes, all federal contract 
appeals in which the United States is a defendant, appeals from the Court of 
International Trade, and a few other agency review cases.242 
The Atari decision was cognizant of this legislative history and considered it 
carefully in construing the breadth of the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction.243 
But the court did not consider how its choice-of-law rule might contribute to the 
specialization of the court. 
It is worth clarifying what is meant by a “specialized” court. Professor Edward 
Cheng has suggested that there is a spectrum, ranging from generalist on one end, to 
“narrow specialist” on the other.244 But, practically, he defines a court as 
“specialized” if it “deviates from the generalist ideal,” which he defines as a “court 
that hears all cases (or a close approximation).”245 Although Congress did not intend 
the Federal Circuit to be specialized, “as that term is normally used,”246 it deviates 
from the generalist ideal. And, as a result, characterizing the Federal Circuit has 
proved challenging to scholars and commentators.247 
                                                   
239 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981) (“The proposed new court is not a ‘specialized 
court.’”); S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16 (“The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will not be a ‘specialized court,’ as that term is 
normally used.”). 
240 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 19 (1981). 
241 H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 18 (1981). 
242 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312 (1981); Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 
38. 
243 See Atari Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1436–37 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
244 Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526 
(2008). 
245 Id. at 526–27. 
246 S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 16. 
247 Compare Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 38, at 391 (noting that the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals “merged with the Court of Claims to create the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which retained its specialized authority”), id. at 404 
(“Congress decided to create a new kind of specialized tribunal.”), Dreyfuss, A Case Study, 
supra note 16, at 29–30 & n.178 (describing Federal Circuit as a specialized court), and John 
M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-
Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 553 n.2 (2010) (describing the Federal 
Circuit as “semi-specialized” because “substantial portions of [its] docket[] encompass[] 
issues outside . . . patent law”), with Randall R. Rader, Specialized Courts: The Legislative 
Response, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1991) (suggesting that the Federal Circuit has not 
become a specialized court). 
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But regardless of how the court is characterized, there is an issue of how to 
assess how “generalist” the court was intended to be by design and whether its 
choice-of-law rule may have caused the court to develop into a more specialized 
court. In one respect, the court’s rule has the potential to effect greater specialization. 
The rule generally requires the Federal Circuit to defer to the regional circuit courts 
on issues of procedural law that do not pertain to patent law. Through the rule, the 
court is attempting to “segregate” issues of patent law from issues of procedural 
law.248 But Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss suggests this sort of “segregability” comes 
at a cost. In evaluating specialized adjudication, more generally, she notes that 
segregability can cause the tribunal to isolate itself, “lose touch with the generalized 
judiciary, fail to perceive developing trends in the law, and overutilize the techniques 
at its disposal.”249 Procedural lawmaking has traditionally been controlled or 
supervised by the judiciary.250 Thus, by foregoing the opportunity to interpret, apply, 
and develop procedural law, the Federal Circuit may be losing touch with, and 
failing to participate in, one of the core functions of a generalized judiciary. 
But this theory of the effects of the court’s choice-of-law rule may rest on an 
overly formalistic and cramped understanding of judging. When the Federal Circuit 
defers to the regional circuit law, it still must engage with the law, apply it to the 
facts at hand, and exercise judgment where the law requires the resolution of 
ambiguities, whether in a statute, the regional circuit’s precedent, the common law, 
or otherwise.251 Indeed, in instances where the regional circuit has not addressed a 
particular procedural issue before the Federal Circuit, the court endeavors to predict 
how the regional circuit would have decided the issue.252 This process is seemingly 
deferential, but in actuality it requires the exercise of judgment.253 Moreover, the 
court interprets, applies, and develops its own law with respect to at least some 
procedural issues, namely, those that pertain to patent law (however incorrectly the 
                                                   
248 See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 38, at 413. 
249 Id. 
250 See, e.g., Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future, supra note 176, at 417 (citing 
Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. REV. 163, 171 
(1915)) (“Judicial control over some modicum of procedural rulemaking has a centuries-old 
pedigree in Anglo-American law.”). 
251 Cf. Cheng, supra note 244, at 558 (noting that appellate courts can serve a 
“lawmaking function, whether through resolving statutory ambiguities, filling gaps in 
precedent, or developing pockets of common law”). 
252 Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(per curiam) (“Where the regional circuit court has not spoken, we need to predict how that 
regional circuit would have decided the issue in light of the decisions of that circuit’s various 
district courts, public policy, etc.”). 
253 Indeed, Erie and its progeny rest on the assumption that, by applying state 
substantive law, federal courts are being duly deferential to the prerogatives of the states. 
But that too is a bit of a fiction. See, e.g., Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views 
Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1682 (1992) 
(“The federal judge’s prediction of state law in the absence of a dispositive holding of the 
state supreme court often verges on the lawmaking function of that state court.”). 
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court may draw the line between procedural and substantive issues). And in doing 
so, it necessarily engages with procedural law and exercises judgment, albeit in a 
way that tracks closely to the specialized subject matter. It is therefore uncertain 
whether, and if so to what extent, the court’s choice-of-law rule facilitates 
specialization of the Federal Circuit. 
 
F.  Administrability 
 
Finally, the Federal Circuit was motivated to adopt its choice-of-law rule, at 
least in part, because of the rule’s ease of administration. In deciding what precedent 
to apply, the Panduit and Atari courts contemplated how the district courts would 
implement whatever rule the court articulated. Both concluded that district courts 
should not be required to apply the law of two circuits254—to “serve[] two 
masters.”255 In addition, the court considered which court—the district courts or the 
Federal Circuit—could more easily internalize the challenges associated with any 
given rule.256 
There is something to this concern. It is almost certainly easier for twelve 
judges from the same court, acting collectively, to consistently apply a chosen 
choice-of-law rule with an eye toward creating uniformity in substantive patent law, 
than it is for the hundreds of district court judges sitting on the ninety-four federal 
district courts to internalize and apply the rule in a consistent manner. 
But the rule does not entirely eliminate the district court’s burden of having to 
apply the procedural law of more than one circuit court. Indeed, the rule was never 
designed to do so. Since its articulation in Panduit, the court’s rule has contemplated 
that there would be procedural issues pertinent to patent law that would require the 
court to apply its own precedent and, accordingly, require the district courts to apply 
Federal Circuit precedent in all similar, subsequent cases. At the same time, the 
district courts are required to apply the procedural law of the regional circuit in 
which they are situated to all other, non-patent issues. The district courts therefore 
cannot escape being bound by the authority of two courts of appeals. 
                                                   
254 See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(concluding it would be “unfair” to require district courts to apply law of Federal Circuit and 
regional circuit to substantive law issue); Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574 (“[P]ractitioners within 
the jurisdiction of a particular regional circuit court should not be required to practice law 
and to counsel clients in light of two different sets of law for an identical issue due to the 
different routes of appeal. An equal, if not more important, consideration is that district 
judges also should not be required to decide cases in this fashion.”). 
255 Atari, 747 F.2d at 1439. 
256 See Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575 (“Although the adoption of this policy could on 
occasion require this court to reach disparate results in procedural matters in light of disparate 
viewpoints from the regional circuit courts, it is nonetheless preferable for the twelve judges 
of this court to handle such conflicts rather than for countless practitioners and hundreds of 
district judges to do so.” (emphasis added)). 
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Moreover, as applied, the rule is likely difficult for district courts to administer. 
Because the rule requires the Federal Circuit to identify procedural issues that are 
pertinent to patent law such that the Federal Circuit’s precedent should apply, the 
rule necessarily requires appellate court review before it is clear which circuit’s 
precedent should apply. This sequencing complicates the district court’s process of 
deciding patent cases in the first instance, as opposed to on remand. And because it 
requires appellate review first, it makes the Federal Circuit’s rule costly to 
administer over the long run. 
The rule has proven difficult for the Federal Circuit to administer as well. The 
court has had to revisit the rule a number of times, redrawing the “boundaries” that 
demark the issues to which its precedent applies.257 Perhaps it is unavoidable that, 
as a (somewhat) specialized court, the Federal Circuit would be tasked with creating 
at least some amount of “boundary law”—what Dreyfuss defines as “criteria for 
determining when a case is within its jurisdiction,”258 but which could be extended 
to include criteria for determining when a case should be treated by the court’s 
precedent. But the question is whether the court’s rule requires it to devote more 
resources to boundary lawmaking than a reasonable, alternative choice-of-law rule 
might require. Because the rule requires the court to draw a boundary along the 
precarious divide between procedure and substance, the court’s boundary law is 
destined to require repeated revision. And a rule that did not necessitate regular 
attendance to the boundaries—for example, a rule that does not require the court to 
parse procedural issues from substantive ones—would be comparatively easier to 
administer. Thus, although the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule was created with 
at least one of its objectives to make the rule easy to administer, the rule creates a 
number of challenges. 
 
* * * 
 
In sum, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule creates a number of problems. 
Perhaps most importantly, it undermines the court’s ability to develop patent law in 
a uniform manner and enables the court to make substantive determinations in a non-
transparent way. In addition, the rule contributes to forum shopping among the 
regional circuit courts and, in at least some respects, is difficult to administer. 
At the same time, the court’s rule discourages forum shopping between the 
Federal Circuit, on the one hand, and the regional circuits, on the other; addresses 
some of the challenges presented by the court’s unique jurisdictional grant; and is 
likely neutral with respect to its effects on the specialization of the Federal Circuit. 
Because the elements of this analysis point in opposing directions, it is difficult 
to condemn the rule outright. In addition, the root cause of the rule and some of its 
                                                   
257 See, e.g., Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (“[W]e conclude that the rigid division between substantive patent law issues and 
all other substantive and procedural issues, which was the basis for the court’s choice-of-law 
ruling . . . , no longer represents this courts approach to choice-of-law questions in patent 
cases.”). 
258 Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 38, at 382. 
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negative effects is the court’s unique jurisdictional grant. When considered in light 
of the challenges presented by the court’s jurisdiction, it is therefore possible that 
alternative rules will fare no better. It is to those potential alternative rules, along 
with other potential solutions, that this Article now turns.  
 
IV.  POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
There are at least two types of solutions to the challenges posed by the Federal 
Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. One is for the court to adopt an alternative choice-of-
law rule. The second is a structural solution that would create specialized trial courts 
or, at least, effect the same solution as if such specialized courts were created. Both 
solutions are considered below.  
 
A.  Alternative Choice-of-Law Rules 
 
There are at least two alternatives to the Federal Circuit’s current rule: apply 
the law of the regional court in which a case originated or apply and develop Federal 
Circuit law to all issues. 
 
1.  Apply the Law of the Originating Regional Circuit 
 
One alternative is a rule that would require the court to apply the law of the 
regional circuit in which the case originated to all legal issues, procedural or 
otherwise, and regardless of whether those issues pertain to patent law. This 
“originating-court” rule is seemingly simple in its formulation. And at first blush, it 
seems easy to apply. Indeed, it is somewhat similar to a federal choice-of-law rule 
already applied in federal courts.259 
But as a practical matter, the originating-court rule may operate similarly to the 
rule the court already applies. The originating-court rule would require the federal 
courts to faithfully apply the law of the regional circuit court in which a case 
originated to all claims, such that the Federal Circuit would be nothing more than a 
change in appellate courtrooms.260 But, of course, because of the court’s unique 
jurisdictional grant, there is virtually261 no appellate patent law outside of the Federal 
                                                   
259 Specifically, it is analogous to the rule applied to claims arising under state law and 
then transferred from one federal district court to another pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 
(2018). That rule stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 
U.S. 612 (1964), and it requires the federal court to apply the law of the state of the transferor 
court. See id. at 639. Notably, however, Van Dusen does not require a federal court to apply 
the procedural law of another jurisdiction. See id at 642–43. 
260 Cf. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639 (“A change in venue under § 1404(a) generally 
should be, with respect to state law, but a change in courtrooms.”). 
261 Prior to amendments to the patent act in 2011, the Federal Circuit did not have 
exclusive jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising under the patent laws. See 
supra note 42. Consequently, if there were no patent claims on the face of the plaintiff’s 
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Circuit to be applied. The Federal Circuit would therefore need to develop and apply 
patent law at the appellate level.262 
Were the Federal Circuit to develop patent law at the appellate level, while 
otherwise applying the law of the regional circuit court in which the case originated, 
the court’s practice would closely resemble the court’s current rule. To be sure, it 
would not explicitly rely on the substance-procedure dichotomy. But, as applied, the 
rule very likely would rely on a similar formulation to identify substantive patent 
issues. Such a rule would bring with it all the same problems that exist with the 
present rule. The only difference would be that, without a decisional rule that 
expressly relies on the substance-procedure dichotomy guiding the court, the Federal 
Circuit might be even less transparent when making substantive law determinations. 
 
2.  Develop and Apply the Law of the Federal Circuit 
 
While the prior rule would apply the law of the originating court to all legal 
issues, another alternative would require the Federal Circuit to apply and develop its 
own law to all legal issues. For example, if a plaintiff filed suit in the Northern 
District of Illinois, asserting both copyright and patent claims, on appeal, the Federal 
Circuit would apply Federal Circuit law to the copyright issues, the patent issues, 
and the procedural issues, rather than applying Seventh Circuit law to the copyright 
issues and non-patent procedural issues. Some version of this rule has been 
suggested by at least a few commentators.263 Under this “own-law” rule, the Federal 
Circuit’s precedent, once developed, would bind the district courts in appropriate 
cases, such that the district court would apply the Federal Circuit’s precedent in all 
future similar cases. Appropriate cases would be cases that are within the Federal 
Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction. Such a rule would reflect the appellate path of the 
case.264 Thus, to return to the example, the Northern District of Illinois would also 
                                                   
complaint, those sorts of compulsory counterclaims would be appealed to the regional 
circuit. However, in those instances, because the regional circuit courts had jurisdiction over 
very few patent-related claims, they would look to and apply the patent law of the Federal 
Circuit. See Schinzing v. Mid-States Stainless, Inc., 415 F.3d 807, 811 (8th Cir. 2005) (“In 
examining this case, we adopt the Federal Circuit’s precedent on substantive issues of patent 
law.”). I am grateful to Tim Holbrook for sharing this insight and providing this example. 
262 Theoretically, another alternative exists: Instead of developing patent law at the 
appellate level, the Federal Circuit could defer to the patent law determinations of the district 
courts. This practice, however, seems highly unlikely because it would essentially transform 
the Federal Circuit’s appellate review, such that it would resemble the type of deferential 
review normally accorded agency determinations. See Jennifer E. Sturiale, Hatch-Waxman 
Patent Litigation and Inter Partes Review: A New Sort of Competition, 69 ALA. L. REV. 59, 
93 (2017) (noting that the Federal Circuit applies a more deferential standard of review to 
determinations by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board than it does to decisions by the district 
courts).  
263 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, A Case Study, supra note 16, at 44–45; Moore, supra note 16, at 
800; Karol, supra note 16, at 3. 
264 Cf. Robert Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal Law: The Appellate Model, 93 
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apply Federal Circuit law to the copyright issues and the non-patent procedural 
issues, as well as the patent issues. District courts are well accustomed to assessing 
whether a case falls within their jurisdiction.265 Therefore they should be able to 
determine whether a case falls within those described in § 1338 and can additionally 
be appealed to the Federal Circuit. 
The own-law rule has a lot of appeal. First, the rule does not rely on the 
substance-procedure dichotomy and consequently would not require the court to 
characterize issues to conform with it. Second, because the Federal Circuit would 
develop and apply its own law to all issues, it could ensure that issues pertaining to 
patent law—regardless of whether presented as strictly substantive issues or 
contained within procedural issues—are decided in a uniform manner. Third, the 
rule would very likely prevent the Federal Circuit from departing from the trans-
substantivity principle. Without the court’s complicated choice-of-law rule 
interposing in its analysis, it would be readily apparent if the court were inclined to 
apply patent law differently from one procedural context to the next. This 
transparency would very likely force the court to justify its inconsistent substantive 
determinations, which would have the concomitant effect of enabling scrutiny of the 
court’s rationale. Alternatively, such transparency could discourage the court from 
making such determinations in the first place. Fourth, insofar as the court’s present 
rule does, indeed, facilitate the specialization of the Federal Circuit, the own-law 
rule would prevent that effect by enabling the court to engage in its core function of 
interpreting, applying, and developing procedural law. 
At the same time, the own-law rule likely undermines the court’s other 
objectives. First, the rule would encourage regional-circuit/Federal-Circuit forum 
shopping. Under the own-law rule, Federal Circuit law would apply to all issues. 
Consequently, no longer would a litigant gain an advantage with respect to 
procedural issues266 simply from filing suit in one circuit over another. Thus, the rule 
                                                   
MICH. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (1995) (arguing that, in cases arising under federal law and 
transferred from one federal court to another pursuant to § 1404 or § 1407, federal courts 
apply the law of the circuit to which a case will be appealed). Under the present version of 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdictional statute, cases within its appellate jurisdiction are those 
“arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(1) (2018). Those cases constitute a subset of cases falling within the district court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction, as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2018). Section 1338 
provides, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under 
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.” 
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2018). Thus, the district courts would apply the law of the Federal 
Circuit if the case fell within the Federal Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction and the district 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. And in all other instances, a district court would follow 
the law of the regional circuit court that geographically embraced it. 
265 See, e.g., Local 377, RWDSU, UFCW v. 1864 Tenants Ass’n, 533 F.3d 98, 99 (2d 
Cir. 2008); Micei Int’l v. Dep’t of Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2010); cf. 
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002) (“[I]t is familiar law that a federal court 
always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.”).  
266 To be sure, the own-law rule would do nothing to prevent forum shopping motivated 
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would discourage regional-circuit/regional-circuit forum shopping. But if the 
Federal Circuit developed and applied its own procedural law, litigants might gain 
an advantage from having Federal Circuit, as opposed to regional circuit, law apply. 
This advantage would incentivize parties to add patent claims or counterclaims 
simply to get their cases within the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The legislative 
history of the court’s enabling statute was concerned about this very problem.267 
Thus, the own-law rule would be at odds with Congress’s intentions. 
Second, the own-law rule creates its own administrability difficulties. The rule 
would require district courts to apply Federal Circuit precedent if that is the court to 
which the case would ultimately be appealed. But the appellate path of a case is not 
necessarily apparent at the outset of a case. Complaints can be amended,268 
counterclaims added,269 or cases consolidated.270 Any of these events may result in 
patent claims entering a case and changing a case’s appellate path.271 These sorts of 
everyday procedural developments would raise difficult questions about whether 
district court rulings that occurred before patent claims were added to the case should 
be revisited and, ironically, what law the Federal Circuit should apply to those issues 
                                                   
by issues other than the applicable procedural law. 
267 See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15; H.R. 
REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-21 (1981). 
268 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1) (providing that a party is entitled to amend its pleading 
once within 21 days of service of a pleading or 21 days after the earlier of service of a 
responsive pleading or a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f)); id. at (a)(2) (providing that a 
party may amend at any time with opposing party’s written consent or court’s leave). 
269 See FED. R. CIV. P. (13)(1) (providing circumstances under which a pleading must 
state a compulsory counterclaim); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (providing for Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims arising under the patent laws). 
270 See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (permitting consolidation of actions); In re Innotron 
Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1081–81 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (concluding the Federal Circuit had 
jurisdiction over case that had patent claims after consolidation). But see generally Microsoft 
Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 564 Fed. Appx. 586 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (transferring appeal of 
consolidated case containing patent claims from Federal Circuit to Ninth Circuit because the 
Ninth Circuit had presided over appeal of preliminary injunction before the case was 
consolidated and, pursuant to the law of the case, the court adhered to the Ninth Circuit’s 
prior jurisdictional ruling). 
271 If, however, any of these events resulted in patent claims exiting a case, the Federal 
Circuit’s jurisdiction would not change. As long as a patent claim satisfied the well-pleaded 
complaint rule at the outset of the litigation, then the court continues to maintain jurisdiction 
over the case, even if the patent claims are no longer in the case. See, e.g., Abbott Labs v. 
John F. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The path of appeal is 
determined by the basis of jurisdiction in the district court, and is not controlled by the district 
court’s decision or the substance of the issues that are appealed. . . . [T]he direction of appeal 
to the Federal Circuit does not change during or after trial, even when the only issues 
remaining are not within our exclusive assignment.”). The Federal Circuit’s decision in 
Oracle v. Google, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018), is a recent example: By the time the case 
got to the Federal Circuit, the patent claims were no longer a part of the suit; only the 
copyright claims remained. See id. at 1185 n.2. 
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on appeal. This sort of inquiry has the potential to take the court down a path much 
like the one it is already on, creating many of the same problems.272 Moreover, under 
the own-law rule, district courts would continue to apply regional circuit law to all 
cases that were not on an appellate path to the Federal Circuit. Thus, the rule would 
continue to require district courts to look to the law of two courts of appeals and 
essentially serve two masters. 
Another factor to consider is the competency of the Federal Circuit. Others have 
argued that federal courts are competent to decide issues of federal law and, 
therefore, there is no need for a federal court to defer to the judgment of a sister 
court.273 This argument is perhaps most notably made in In re Korean Air Lines 
Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,274 a decision by the D.C. Circuit authored by then-Judge 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Korean Air Lines involved an aircraft destroyed by the Soviet 
Union over the Sea of Japan.275 A number of wrongful death actions were filed 
against the airline in numerous federal district courts.276 The Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation transferred the various actions to the District Court for the 
District of Columbia for pre-trial proceedings.277 The question presented to the 
district court was whether the airline’s damages were limited pursuant to 
international agreement.278 The district court considered but refused to follow 
Second Circuit precedent that concluded that the airline’s damages were limited.279 
The issue presented to the D.C. Circuit was whether the law of the transferor 
forum—i.e., Second Circuit law—should apply to claims transferred to the MDL.280 
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court. It concluded that the MDL court 
should be “free to decide a federal claim in the manner it views as correct without 
deferring to the interpretation of the transferor circuit.”281 The court noted, 
                                                   
272 For example, one can imagine the court deciding to apply the regional circuit law to 
issues decided prior to the addition of the patent claims, whether pursuant to a new choice-
of-law rule, the law of the case, or otherwise. If the regional circuits’ law was inconsistent 
on these issues, the court may again be developing law within the Federal Circuit in an 
inconsistent manner. And the district courts would continue to be responsible to more than 
one appellate court. 
273 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the 
Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 701–02 (1984) [hereinafter R. Marcus, Conflicts 
Among Circuits], discussed in Karol, supra note 16, at 21–27; see also Karol, supra note 16, 
at 38–40 (concluding that the Federal Circuit should not defer to the judgment of the regional 
circuits, in part because it suggests the court is not competent to make independent 
determinations of federal procedure). 
274 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
275 Id. at 1172. 
276 Id.  
277 Id.  
278 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1463, 1464 
(D.D.C. 1985).  
279 See id. at 1474, 1478.  
280 See Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1174. 
281 Id. (quoting R. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits, supra note 273, at 721). 
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[T]he federal courts have not only the power but the duty to decide issues 
of federal law correctly. There is no room in the federal system of review 
for rote acceptance of the decision of a court outside the chain of direct 
review. If a federal court simply accepts the interpretation of another 
circuit without independently addressing the merits, it is not doing its 
job.282 
 
Korean Air Lines has emerged as the dominant choice-of-law rule for cases 
arising under federal law and transferred within the federal system.283 On the face of 
it, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion would seem to suggest that a federal court has an 
obligation to apply its own law. Indeed, at least one scholar has suggested as 
much.284 
But it is not clear that Korean Air Lines should be read so broadly. First, the 
considerations underlying Korean Air Lines are very different than those underlying 
the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule. The precise question and context of the 
federal choice-of-law issue in Korean Air Lines is entirely different from that of the 
choice-of-law issue presented to the Federal Circuit. Korean Air Lines importantly 
considered what law should be applied at the trial court level to cases transferred as 
part of an MDL,285 not what law should be applied at the appellate court level. An 
MDL can be created by transferring cases from any (and all) of the federal district 
courts embraced by any (and all) of the twelve circuits. Had the D.C. Circuit adopted 
a choice-of-law rule that required an MDL judge to apply the law of the transferor 
court, a judge presiding over an MDL constituted of cases from more than one circuit 
would have to manage those cases on separate, circuit-specific tracks for the duration 
of the pretrial proceedings. And although cases transferred to an MDL are supposed 
to be remanded back to the transferor court at the completion of the pretrial 
proceedings, most cases are settled or disposed of before the MDL judge.286 Thus, 
                                                   
282 Id. at 1175 (quoting R. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits, supra note 273, at 702); 
cf. Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1900) (interpreting the 
Evarts Act and concluding that one regional circuit was not bound by or obligated to follow 
the law of another regional circuit that had previously decided the very same issue). 
283 See, e.g., Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting Korean Air 
Lines in multidistrict litigation); Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777, 782 n.4 (4th Cir. 
1998) (applying law of transferee court in suit transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)); 
Murphy v. F.D.I.C., 208 F.3d 959, 964-66 (11th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Jennifer E. 
Sturiale, The Unseen Force in Civil Litigation: The Chief Justice’s Appointment of the 
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (April 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
284 See R. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits, supra note 273, at 679. 
285 A full examination of the MDL choice-of-law rule is beyond the scope of this article. 
I undertake such an examination in other work. See generally Sturiale, supra note 283. 
286 Data from 2017 indicate less than three percent of the cases transferred to an MDL 
since 1968, when the multidistrict litigation statute was enacted and the JPML was created, 
have been remanded back to the transferor court. See ADMIN. OFF. OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL 
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION – JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2017 (2017), 
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the rule would have been very difficult for MDL judges to administer, while 
providing almost no benefit to the court that transferred the action to begin with.287 
In adopting its choice-of-law rule, the Federal Circuit was motivated by some 
of these very same considerations. For example, the Federal Circuit was concerned 
about imposing a rule on district courts that would require them to apply the law of 
more than one circuit. And at the trial court level, the court’s rule attempts to achieve 
similar ends—i.e., it attempts to have trial courts apply one body of familiar 
procedural law. But the court’s unique jurisdiction, combined with the fact that the 
court was adopting a rule to be implemented at the appellate level, resulted in the 
Federal Circuit adopting a rule that requires it to apply multiple bodies of law. 
Second, there are examples within the federal system that undercut the force of 
Korean Air Lines’ reasoning.288 Specifically, there are instances in which federal 
courts refrain from making independent determinations about federal law, choosing 
instead to defer to the judgment of another tribunal. For example, consistent with 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and Supreme 
Court precedent construing that statute,289 a federal court may not grant a prisoner’s 
habeas corpus petition based on its independent interpretation of the applicable 
federal law. Instead, a federal court may only grant habeas relief if the state court’s 
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law.”290 
Similarly, under the Administrative Procedure Act,291 and the Court’s 
jurisprudence construing it, a federal court reviewing an agency’s construction of a 
statute does not independently construe the statute if Congress has not directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.292 Rather, as long as the agency’s 
                                                   
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-panel-multidistrict-litigation-judicial-
business-2017 [https://perma.cc/YH3T-5FYP]. 
287 Professor Bob Ragazzo argues for the contrary rule: He argues that the MDL judge 
should apply the law of the transferor court, which would reflect the appellate path of the 
case and the fact that cases transferred to an MDL are supposed to be remanded back to the 
transferor court at the completion of pretrial proceedings. See Ragazzo, supra note 264, at 
746–69. Ragazzo’ s argument, however, does not reflect the present-day reality that an MDL 
judge may not permanently transfer a case to itself pursuant to § 1404(a), see Lexecon Inc. 
v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 27–28 (1998), and that cases made 
a part of an MDL are rarely remanded. 
288 Thanks to Vicki Jackson for suggesting the examples. 
289 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000). 
290 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2018); Williams, 529 U.S. at 410 (“[T]he most important 
point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect 
application of federal law.”). 
291 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596 (2018). 
292 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984) (“The 
court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could 
have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached 
if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” (citations omitted)). 
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interpretation of the statute is a “permissible construction,”293 a federal court defers 
to the agency’s construction. These examples suggest that priorities other than 
“decid[ing] issues of federal law correctly” may sometimes justify a court refraining 
from “independently addressing the merits” of a case.294 
Finally, even if Korean Air Lines accurately describes an obligation of the 
federal courts, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule contravenes 
that obligation. In adopting its choice-of-law rule, the Federal Circuit was arguably 
engaged in a legitimate exercise of its substantive lawmaking authority. In other 
words, the court was exercising its duty to decide an issue of federal law. It may 
simply be the case that the relevant issue of federal law—i.e., the issue of what 
precedent the Federal Circuit should apply—requires the court to defer to the 
regional circuits in the instances outlined by the court. Thus, the court’s unique 
jurisdiction and the challenges it presents may justify the court’s deference to the 
regional circuits on issues of procedural law. 
In sum, the own-law rule would better enable the Federal Circuit to develop 
and apply patent law in a uniform and transparent manner, and to do so while 
engaging in a core judicial function of procedural lawmaking, thereby avoiding 
becoming over-specialized. But the rule does so at the cost of encouraging regional-
circuit/Federal-Circuit forum shopping. Moreover, implementing the rule may be 
challenging and produce some of the same problems the present rule does. 
 
* * * 
 
When the costs of these three rules—the Federal Circuit’s present rule, along 
with the two alternatives—are compared against the benefits of these rules, no rule 
emerges as clearly better than the others. As a practical matter, the originating-court 
rule is likely no different than the present rule, and, therefore, requiring the court to 
adopt a new rule and change its practice hardly seems worth the trouble. The own-
law rule, in contrast, is more promising. It better enables the Federal Circuit to 
achieve uniformity of patent law, one of the principle reasons for the creation of the 
Federal Circuit in the first place. But this rule too risks causing some of the same 
problems as the present rule, while also encouraging the very forum shopping that 
Congress sought to avoid. 
So, what is the Federal Circuit to do? Although, in adopting its choice-of-law 
rule, the court contemplated many of the values analyzed above, the court’s analysis 
was not appropriately fulsome. But as the above discussion indicates, even a more 
fulsome analysis does not point inextricably in favor of one rule over another. 
Without congressional intervention, the court must make a normative determination 
as to what objectives are valued more: ensuring uniformity of patent law, 
constraining judicial lawmaking, discouraging forum shopping (of one type or 
                                                   
293 Id. at 866. 
294 Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1175. 
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another), avoiding the specialization of the Federal Circuit, or ensuring the ease of 
administration of the chosen rule.295 
The fact that the Federal Circuit was created primarily to develop patent law in 
a uniform manner suggests that preserving its ability to make patent law uniform 
should be paramount. But as the discussion above suggests, even the rule most likely 
to encourage uniformity—the own-law rule—does not entirely obviate the problem 
of disuniformity. The own-law rule would require the court to engage in the difficult 
task of determining what law should apply to district court rulings in cases where 
patent claims are later added to the case, potentially causing the court to continue to 
apply regional circuit law to at least some procedural issues. Thus, regardless of 
whether the court adopts a new choice-of-law rule, it will have to sit uncomfortably 
with some amount of disuniformity. 
 
B.  A Structural Solution 
 
The above discussion has been confined to examining the Federal Circuit’s 
present choice-of-law rule and potential alternative rules. But as the discussion hints, 
the root cause of the problems identified with both the court’s rule and the 
alternatives is ultimately the court’s unique jurisdiction. Because the court may hear 
appeals from any of the federal district courts, situated in any of the twelve courts 
of appeals, the court must cope with the fact that the cases it hears originate in 
circuits that have differing procedural law. 
A full consideration of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, the problems it 
presents, and potential solutions to those problems is beyond the scope of this 
Article. However, here, two potential structural solutions are worth considering. One 
way of addressing the problem would be to create specialized patent trial courts 
whose decisions would be appealed directly and exclusively to the Federal Circuit. 
These dedicated trial courts would apply one uniform body of both substantive 
                                                   
295 Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule requires evaluation of normative 
priorities in much the same way that the Erie Doctrine does. Both require consideration of 
whether uniformity and trans-substantivity of procedural law (which is justified on grounds 
of constraining judicial lawmaking) justify overriding other interests that are at stake. In the 
context of the Erie Doctrine, those other interests are the states’ authority to define 
substantive law. See Suzanna Sherry, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Why the Court Can’t Fix 
the Erie Doctrine, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 173, 173–174 (2013) (arguing that resolving 
difficult Erie issues requires a “normative justification” that “depends on whether we place 
a greater value on the uniformity and transsubstantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or on states’ ultimate authority to define substantive rights”). In the context of the 
Federal Circuit’s choice-of-law rule, the other interests are, among other things, the 
uniformity of patent law and respecting regional circuit differences. For the reasons 
discussed supra Section III.C, uniformity of patent law very likely justifies departing from 
the uniformity and trans-substantivity of procedural law, more generally. In other words, the 
Federal Circuit is very likely justified in making patent-specific procedural law. However, 
respecting regional circuit differences—at least by the Federal Circuit—likely does not 
justify the court developing procedural law in disparate ways. 
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(patent) law and procedural law—the law of the Federal Circuit. Dedicated, 
specialized trial courts would obviate the choice-of-law issue, which, in turn, would 
enable the Federal Circuit to develop one uniform body of both substantive (patent) 
law and procedural law. 
This solution, however, is not without its challenges. It would obviously require 
additional resources. In addition, the creation of permanent specialized courts at the 
trial court level is likely to be controversial. Judge Diane Wood, for example, has 
extolled the virtues of the generalist judge296 and has recommended that the Federal 
Circuit no longer have exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.297 It is, therefore, 
unlikely that such a proposal is politically feasible. 
Another possibility is to take advantage of, and experiment with, the Patent 
Pilot Program (“PPP”). The PPP is a ten-year program aimed at making patent 
litigation more predictable and efficient by encouraging some amount of 
specialization in the district courts.298 The PPP achieves these goals by enabling 
judges within certain districts299 to decline to hear patent cases randomly assigned 
to them300 and allowing others to volunteer to be “designated” by their respective 
chief judges to have the declined cases randomly reassigned to them.301 These 
reassigned cases are then added to those initially assigned to the designated judges 
under the standard random-assignment process.302 Thus, designated judges hear a 
disproportionate number of patent cases.303 The PPP could therefore be thought of 
                                                   
296 See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, Speech at a 
Symposium on Dennis Patterson’s Law and Truth: Law, Truth, and Interpretation (Feb. 11, 
1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767–68 (1997) (“In my view, the contributions of the 
generalist judiciary are still far too great to abandon.”). 
297 See Hon. Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal 
Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases? (Sept. 26, 2013), in 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. 
PROP. 1, 9–10 (2014). 
298 See 155 CONG. REC. H3457–58 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2009) (statement of Rep. Schiff); 
see also Randall R. Rader, Addressing the Elephant: The Potential Effects of the Patent 
Cases Pilot Program and Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 
(2013) (“Congress created this ten-year pilot project with the goal of increasing U.S. district 
court judge expertise and efficiency in adjudicating patent cases.”). 
299 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts designated the districts from 
the fifteen judicial districts with the most patent filings in 2010 or from the districts that had 
adopted local rules for patent cases. Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111–349, § 1, 124 Stat. 
3674, 3675.  
300 See id. §§ 1(a)(1)(B) (random assignment), (C) (may decline to accept the case). 
301 Id. §§ 1(a)(1)(A) (designated by chief judge), (D) (declined cases randomly 
reassigned to designated judges). 
302 See id. §§ 1(a)(1)(B), (D). 
303 See, e.g., MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT PILOT 
PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR REPORT 31–32 (2016), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2016/ 
Patent%20Pilot%20Program%20Five-Year%20Report%20(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/83 
G8-QU7A] (reporting that seventy-six percent of all patent cases filed in pilot districts are 
before a designated judge). 
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as creating temporary specialized patent trial courts of a sort. The program started 
in 2011 and is scheduled to expire in 2021.304 
In reviewing decisions by these designated judges relating to cases that were 
initially declined, the Federal Circuit could apply its own precedent to issues of 
substantive patent law and develop and apply its own procedural law. This proposal 
would aim to capture the benefits, while avoiding the costs, of the own-law rule. 
First, assuming these cases are identified as patent cases at the outset of the 
litigation—which is arguably what would enable judges assigned such cases under 
the normal procedure to decline to hear them, in the first place—the designated 
judges would necessarily know the appellate path of the case from the beginning. 
Second, because the designated judges have “opted in” to hear a disproportionate 
number of patent cases, it is likely that they have a greater interest in substantive 
patent law. And from that interest, there is a suggestion—although it is far from 
clear—that they are more willing to invest in learning and applying Federal Circuit 
law, including non-patent law. The proposal could therefore avoid the 
administrability difficulties that might otherwise obtain with the own-law rule. 
Third, because the designated judges are only assigned a case once it has been 
declined by a judge through the normal procedure, a litigant would not know when 
it initially filed its complaint whether a judge would ultimately decline to hear it and 
that it would be assigned to a designated judge. Thus, the proposal would avoid 
regional-circuit/Federal-Circuit forum shopping. In addition, to avoid the costs of 
the own-law rule, this proposal would enable the Federal Circuit to begin to create 
a uniform body of procedural law both at the appellate level and at the trial court 
level. 
This proposal, however, hinges on the assumption that patent cases are 
accurately identified as such at the outset of the litigation. But it is not clear that the 
PPP-participating district courts review a case’s identification as a “patent case” for 
accuracy before permitting the case to be reassigned, nor, if they do, that they do so 
uniformly.305 It is therefore possible that some cases that are reassigned to the 
designated judges will not actually implicate issues of patent law. In other words, 
there will be some false positives. Likewise, it is possible that some cases that 
ultimately turn out to be patent cases will not be reassigned because they are not 
properly identified at the outset of the case. There will consequently be some false 
negatives. Ultimately, the consequences of these errors would be that the subset of 
cases to which the Federal Circuit could apply its own law would be smaller. The 
false negatives, having never been reassigned, would be excluded from having the 
proposed solution apply to them; likewise, the false positives would be excluded 
once it was determined that they did not truly raise issues of patent law. Still, the 
proposal would nonetheless provide the Federal Circuit with an opportunity to 
experiment with developing and applying its own precedent. 
 
                                                   
304 See Act of Jan. 4, 2011, supra note 299, § 1(c). 
305 Thank you to Mark Lemley for helping me to identify this potential problem. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Federal Circuit’s unique jurisdiction has created unique problems for the 
court, including a difficult decision regarding which Court of Appeals’ law to apply. 
The structural solutions discussed above are aimed at preventing the court from 
having to engage in any choice-of-law analysis whatsoever because once the court 
goes down the road of characterizing issues—whether as procedural versus 
substantive, or even as patent versus non-patent—in service of determining what 
law to apply, the problems discussed above seem unavoidable. Thus, barring these 
or other structural solutions, the Federal Circuit will have to continue to wrestle 
uncomfortably with the choice-of-law question and the many conundrums it 
presents. 
